

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PEACEKEEPING IN BURKINA FASO:
A MOTIVATION TO CONTRIBUTE?

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General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PEACEKEEPING IN BURKINA FASO: A MOTIVATION TO CONTRIBUTE? by CPT Sidnoma Francis Abdoul Rachid Ouedraogo, 123 pages.

Within a decade, Burkina Faso has evolved from providing a limited participation to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping to becoming one of the ten top Troop Contributing Countries (TCC). With a relatively small military, Burkina Faso's contribution to UN peacekeeping is considerable and raises questions.

This research analyzes the economic impact of Burkina Faso's large-scale contribution to UN peacekeeping on personnel, the Armed Forces, and the country as a whole. It also seeks to understand the economic motivations of such a peacekeeping-oriented military strategy.

The study shows that Burkina Faso gains financially from UN peacekeeping, as a country and at the individual soldier's level. It also appears that money is a motivation for its contribution. However, the research revealed that a strong involvement in peacekeeping could negatively affect the national security structure and expose the country.

This paper makes several recommendations to optimize Burkina Faso's financial gains in UN peacekeeping and mitigate the risks generated by the export of military expertise.

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ACRONYMS

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
ASF	African Stand-by Force
AU	African Union
BFAF	Burkina Faso Armed Forces
CARL	United States Army Combined Arms Research Library
CGSC	Command and General Staff Course
COE	Contingent-owned Equipment
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FPU	Formed Police Unit
GA	Ghana Army
GAF	Ghana Armed Forces
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHF	Ghana Air Force
GN	Ghana Navy
GNI	Gross National Income
GPS	Ghana Police Service
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization

IMET	International Military Education and Training
LCDR	Lieutenant Commander
LOA	Letter of assist
MILOB	Military Observer
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA	<i>Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad</i>
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
PB	Peace Building
PCC	Police Contributing Country
PEO	Peace Enforcement Operations
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PM	Peacemaking
PO	Peace Operations
SADR	Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOGIL	United Nations Military Observation Group in Lebanon
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping

Lester B. Pearson, a Canadian diplomat thought by some to be the father of United Nations Peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 42), would likely not recognize modern peacekeeping operations. The variety of missions that are considered “peacekeeping operations” are many and not always associated with the United Nations (UN). Nowhere has the change in peacekeeping been more evident than in Africa, with the increase in number and complexity of the missions, as well as the change in the troop contributing nations themselves (Victor 2010, 219). The reasons behind this sudden increase of peacekeeping operations go hand-in-hand with the growing number of conflicts on the continent, most of them internal to countries, which affect stability and development (Emmanuel 2014, 4).

From 1978 to 1990, very few African countries participated in peace operations on the continent (Victor 2010, 219). As of September 2015, thirteen African countries ranked among the top 20 Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) in UN peacekeeping missions all over the world. A large spectrum of motivations justifies the participation of African countries. Economic gain, state legitimacy, and “diversionary strategy”^{*} are some the explanatory factors to the sudden rise of African participation in peace operations (Victor 2010, 222). Nikola Emmanuel identifies “cultural and geographic

^{*} Victor argues that dictators in some TCCs send troops abroad to divert their attention from national problems and avoid the risk of military coup d'états or to get major powers to overlook their autocratic rule.

proximity, the lower cost of responding, and the clear national interest in stabilizing one's neighborhood and reducing the impact of externalities" as other reasons for African participation in peace operations in Africa.

Peacekeeping on the African continent has increased significantly since the 1990s and today, 87 per cent of all peacekeeping troops are deployed in Africa (United Nations Security Council 2015, 1). Following the failure of peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Rwanda respectively in 1993 and 1994, Western powers became reluctant to participate actively in peacekeeping on the African continent. The larger participation of African countries to peace prevention and resolution on the continent gradually became the preferred option. The "Africanization of peace operations" started with the involvement of sub regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with a strong participation of Nigerian forces in Liberia with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Mays 2003).

In February 1999, the United Nations Secretary-General issued report A/54/63 to the General Assembly, following a recommendation of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which called for the enhancement of African countries' participation in peacekeeping through regional organizations. The report emphasized the need for the United Nations to cooperate with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and sub-regional organizations in order to support initiatives on conflict prevention and resolution on the continent. The report identified training, logistical, and financial support as main areas that required a specific emphasis (United Nations General Assembly 1999).

In 2003, the General Assembly “urged the United Nations to contribute, where appropriate, to the enhancement of the capacity of the African Union (AU) to deploy peace support missions” (United Nations General Assembly 2004, 2). Following the birth of the AU as the OAU replacement, member states agreed on the establishment of the African Stand-by Force (ASF) with the view to deal with continental matters related to peace and security. The upswing of African security mechanisms to support peace and security encouraged the UN to take over peace operations in Africa, which were initially under the AU or the ECOWAS’s direction.

Furthermore, in 2009, Report of the Secretary-General A/64/359-S/2009/470 stressed the importance of a formal partnership between the United Nations and the African Union regarding peace operations (United Nations General Assembly 2009, 3). The report laid down the procedures of UN support to AU peacekeeping operations authorized by the UN. Key aspects, inter alia, included the need for a formal cooperation between the UN and the AU, an improvement of the AU’s institutional capacity for peacekeeping operations and more importantly, UN financing of African Union-led, United Nations-authorized peacekeeping operations. The UN Secretary-General, in his report S/2015/229, provides an analysis of the most recent step on this endeavor. This report called for a greater partnership between the UN and the AU as well as between the UN and the European Union (EU) in the conduct and support of peace operations (United Nations Security Council 2015).

The two United Nations peacekeeping missions in which Burkina Faso is primarily involved are the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in

Mali (MINUSMA) fall under the group of “re-hatted” missions that the African Union initiated. Following the signing of a peace agreement between the government of Sudan and opposing factions in April 2005, the AU approved the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in May 2005 (Boshoff 2005, 58). After intensive negotiation by the UN Secretary-General and other international diplomats, the government of Sudan agreed on the deployment of a Hybrid[†] mission UN/AU in 2007. UNSCR 1769 formally established UNAMID by integrating AMIS into a larger peacekeeping force (UNAMID 2016). Similarly, in Mali, following a rebellion and a coup d’état in 2012, Mali interim authorities requested support from the UN in various sectors, including security. This led to the establishment, under UN authorization, of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in December 2012. In April 2013, UNSCR 2100 established MINUSMA to take over from and integrate AFISMA forces (MINUSMA 2016). Burkina Faso, as a member of the African Union as well as ECOWAS, recognized the need to support military operations in Sudan and Mali under the auspices of the AU and ECOWAS. Later, both missions fell under UN authority, respectively as UNAMID and MINUSMA.

Burkina Faso’s participation to United Nations Peacekeeping

On August 4, 2009, Burkina Faso began large-scale military participation in UN peacekeeping operations with an advance party of Battalion “Laafi”[‡] embarked on a UN chartered airplane for Nyala, to support the United Nations Mission in Darfur. Since then,

[†] Hybrid because it has two head organizations: the UN and the AU.

[‡] Laafi means Peace in Moore, the most largely spoken language in Burkina Faso.

two infantry battalions and a Formed Police Unit (FPU) have deployed respectively in Mali and Darfur, bringing the total number of military troops participating in peacekeeping operations to 2,908 personnel.[§] Initially, the then President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore, in his diplomatic efforts and contributions to peace and crises resolution on the African continent, had committed to the UN, the AU and ECOWAS, to send Burkina Faso troops as part of UNAMID. This commitment had the double advantage of supporting Compaore's efforts to redeem himself a positive stature on the international stage, following growing suspicions of bad governance and dictatorial rule, as well as introducing Burkina Faso Armed Forces (BFAF) to a new type of operations: peacekeeping. The UNAMID contingent from Burkina Faso, an infantry battalion-sized contingent, deployed in December 2009 and performed peacekeeping duties in Darfur. Burkina Faso's commitment to participating in peacekeeping increased because of new developments in the security environment in West Africa, specifically in Mali.

Mali is located North-West of Burkina Faso in West Africa. The two countries share many ethnic groups and cultures. Like Burkina Faso, Mali has a history of military coups and unstable governance that has affected its development since its independence from France, in the early 1960s. Claiming that the Malian central government had neglected their region since their independence, the Tuareg *Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad* (MNLA), supported by Islamic extremist groups, began attacking governmental forces in the North of Mali in January 2012 (Oluwadare 2014, 112). On 22 March 2012, a group of soldiers, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo conducted a coup-d'état

[§] In Burkina Faso, the FPU is made of Gendarmerie Mobile companies. Gendarmerie is a component of Burkina Faso Armed Forces.

in Bamako. Sanogo seized power, and dissolved all institutions. The coup worsened the situation in North Mali and MNLA, with other Islamic groups, quickly gained terrain, proclaiming the *Independent State of Azawad* on 6 April 2012. The Heads of States of ECOWAS appointed the President of Burkina Faso to be the mediator and to conduct negotiations that ultimately led to the appointment of the Speaker of National Assembly as interim President of Mali on 12 April 2012 (MINUSMA 2016).

The crisis in Mali had drawn the attention of the international community who were concerned about the political and security repercussions of a Mali falling under extremist groups' control. Like many other West African countries, Burkina Faso boldly committed to send 500 troops and staff officers to support the fight against terrorist groups who had taken over from rebel groups (Mehler et al. 2014). These uncontrolled groups had made significant progress towards Bamako and threatened to take control of the whole country. It was then clear to the AU, the ECOWAS and the international community that a coalition intervention in Mali, led by African States, was inevitable. On December 20, 2012, "affirming that the entrenchment of terrorist and criminal groups in northern Mali posed an urgent threat to that region and the entire international community," the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 2085 (United Nations 2016b). UNSCR 2085 authorized the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), to support Malian Defense Forces in their effort to reconquer the North from terrorist and jihadist groups. The UN decided to take over from AFISMA in July 2013 by establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Burkina Faso and other AFISMA contributing countries began to train troops and to acquire necessary equipment to raise the 500 personnel contingent to a

full Infantry Battalion made of 850 soldiers. This requirement fulfilled the standard UN Unit Requirement. The Burkina Faso government named the contingent Battalion “Badenya.”** On request from UN officials, Burkina Faso trains and deploys a second Infantry Battalion at Diabaly, Mali. Battalion “Gondal”†† accounts for the third infantry battalion deployed in UN peacekeeping missions within six years.

Primary Research Question

The participation of Burkina Faso troops to peacekeeping operations has increased over the past decade and required substantial efforts from the Armed Forces. What is the economic impact of Burkina Faso military participation in peacekeeping operations and is it a motivation to contribute?

Secondary Research Questions

In order to achieve a comprehensive answer to the primary research question, the researcher will seek answers to the following questions:

1. Are there economic motivations to Burkina Faso’s participation in peacekeeping operations?
2. How much of the financial return does the Burkina Faso government reinvest in the Armed Forces?
3. What does the individual soldier gain financially through participation to peacekeeping operations?

** Badenya: Fraternity in Dioula.

†† Gondal: “Living together” in Fulfulde.

4. Is financial gain a motivation for soldiers' participation to peacekeeping operations?

Significance of the Thesis

The recent increase of Burkina Faso's contribution to peacekeeping operations has several implications. For a relatively "small" country, Burkina Faso's contribution to peacekeeping operations is considerable. As of April 30, 2016, Burkina Faso provides 2,901 military and police personnel a figure that is very close to that of long lasting contributors such as Nigeria and Ghana (United Nations 2016a). However, considering the size of the BFAF - estimated 10800 (Country Watch 2016) - legitimate questions arise. "The rule of thirds" in military planning (Avezov 2014)—one unit deployed, a second one in training to replace the one currently deployed, and a third unit recovering from deployment—makes it clear that sustaining approximately 25 percent of its active forces in peacekeeping theaters is a challenge for the BFAF. In addition, staffing and equipping these contingents in accordance with UN standards requires considerable resources that a developing country can hardly bear, in spite of the TCCs receiving monthly financial compensation for troops and equipment from the UN.

This research aims at analyzing, the economic impact of Burkina Faso's large-scale participation in peacekeeping operations on personnel, the BFAF, and Burkina Faso as a country. It also seeks to understand the economic motivations of such a peacekeeping-oriented military policy.

Assumptions

Burkina Faso will maintain the size of its troop contribution to UN peacekeeping missions over the next 5 years.

Responses to the survey are honest and reflect participants' opinions.

The exchange rate between the United States Dollar (USD) and the CFA Franc (XOF) is 1 to 500.

Only officers participate as military observers (MILOB), staff officers, and UN police (UNPOL).

Burkina Faso soldiers of all categories, deployed in all types of UN peacekeeping missions, spend 12 months on the mission site.

Limitations

Language constraints: Given that Burkina Faso is a French-speaking country, it was difficult for the researcher to translate accurately the exact meanings of the questionnaire for the participants to the survey.

Military constraints: Due to the nature of military organizations, security clearances required time on both the researcher's side and the surveyed personnel.

Movement and financial constraints: The researcher was a student under the U.S International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and could not travel back to Burkina Faso to conduct research and surveys. Participants received and returned surveys by email. The United States Army Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) provided literature for the research.

Time: This thesis was written during the Command and General Staff Course (CGSC). Multiple academic requirements did not allow for an exhaustive study of all impacts of peacekeeping operations in Burkina Faso.

Delimitations

Peacekeeping in Burkina Faso is a broad topic that can be approached from numerous perspectives. The researcher focused on the financial impact on Burkina Faso.

This research should serve as a tool for leaders to analyze one aspect of peacekeeping in Burkina Faso after five years of continuous and increasing participation. This study could serve as reference for future studies.

Due to time and access constraints, the highest-ranking participant to the survey was a Major. Consequently, the data collected reflects the income level of the given sample.

This thesis will remain unclassified.

Definitions

Conflict Prevention: “Conflict prevention involves diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. It includes early warning, information gathering, and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary-General’s “good offices,” preventive deployment of UN missions or conflict mediation led by the Department of Political Affairs” (United Nations 2015).

Peace Enforcement: Peace enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorization of the Security Council.

It is used to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has decided to act in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority and in accordance with the UN Charter (United Nations 2015).

Peace Operations: “Peace operations (PO) are crisis response and limited contingency operations, and normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. PO include peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace building (PB), post-conflict actions, peacemaking (PM) processes, conflict prevention, and military peace enforcement operations (PEO). PO may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN), another intergovernmental organization (IGO), within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally” (U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012, I-1).

Peacekeeping Operations: “PKO consist of military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, and are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement” (U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012, I-7). In this research paper, we shall refer to all peace operations as “peacekeeping” and uniformed personnel (military and police) involved in such operations are “peacekeepers.”

Peacemaking: “The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it” (U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012, I-9). Peacemaking does not include the deployment of military personnel. It emphasizes on dialogue and mediation to bring opposing parties in a crisis or conflict to a peace agreement.

Summary

Burkina Faso’s recent contribution to UN peace operations is an interesting topic to research because there are limited studies on the topic. Chapter 1 provided the background for the research and defined the author’s motivations and interest in the subject. Chapter 1 also made assumptions, established limitations and delimitations, and defined terms used in the study for the reader.

The next chapter will explore existing literature in order to deepen the understanding of peacekeeping in general, in Africa and in Burkina Faso.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The review of literature consists of an analysis of existing publications on peacekeeping. Secondary sources were used in this part of the research. The author categorized the literature in three groups. The first analyzed works on peacekeeping in general, the history of peacekeeping and major peacekeeping operations. The second focused on Peacekeeping in Africa. The third group relates directly to the research question. Considering the relatively recent large-scale BFAF participation, very few works cover peacekeeping in Burkina Faso in general; even fewer address the economic aspect. Actually, worldwide, a limited number of studies, books, or articles assessed the economic impact of peacekeeping operations on a given TCC. Many studies however cover the economic impact of peacekeeping operations in countries that requested UN military support under chapter VI, VII and VII of the UN charter. In order to conduct a comparative study, the author reviewed the case of Ghana and Nepal.

Peacekeeping

The second edition of *Understanding Peacekeeping* by Alex J. Bellamy, Stuart Griffin and Paul D. Williams conducts a broad and profound analysis of peace operations, from their origin to the current situation of peacekeeping, as well as anticipating future challenges to peace operations. The authors address peacekeeping from both a historical and a conceptual approach. Bellamy, Griffin and Williams define peace operations as “the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) with or without UN authorization, with a mandate or programme to: (1) assist in

the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process; (2) serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or (3) enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace” (Bellamy, Griffin, and Williams 2010, 18).

The first part of the book analyzes peacekeeping through conceptual frameworks within the global political sphere. The authors study four main theories of peace operations: liberal peace theory, global cultural theory, cosmopolitanism, and critical theory.

Liberal peace theory stipulates that democratic states are less likely to go to war with other democracies. In addition, the theory mentions the little probability of such states suffering civil war or anarchy. This assumption relies on strong internal institutions, respect of human rights and commitment to international organizations to set up constraints that privilege peaceful settlement of disputes. Mutual recognition of state legitimacy and interests in international trade also help prevent conflicts. Liberal peace is the most dominant theory related to peace operations. However, countries like China insist that peace operations should respect a state’s sovereignty. This has led the UN to include prerequisites such as requests from host nation before deploying a peacekeeping force. Roland Paris cautions against the rapid post-war “democratization and marketization”^{‡‡} that can hinder long lasting peace. Finally, Mearsheimer refutes the theory’s relevance by identifying cases of conflicts between democratic states and

^{‡‡} The process that countries undergo to attain democracy and free market.

contesting the narrow methods used to draw conclusions (Bellamy, Griffin, and Williams 2010).

Global cultural theory emphasizes the influence of globally accepted norms and international culture on the way in which peacekeeping operations are established and conducted. “The design and conduct of peacekeeping missions reflect not only the interests of the key parties and the perceived lessons of previous operations, but also the prevailing norms of global culture.”

Cosmopolitanism started in the early years of the United Nations when most member states (except the Soviet Union) were willing to have a standing UN army to prevent and stop all aggression. This idea is emerging again through the works of authors such as Woodhouse and Ramsbotham.

Critical theorists approach peacekeeping operations through the angle of values, ideologies, interests, and their contributions to advancing humanity. For many critical theorists, global capitalism directs the orientation of peacekeeping. They argue that the economic “global centre”^{§§} uses peace operations to establish democracy or maintain liberal economy in the areas of the global economy where anarchy and wars are threatening stability. The global capitalist countries then use the “UN, regional organizations and humanitarian agencies” to conduct peace operations.

Bellamy and Williams developed two approaches to peace operations. The Westphalian approach emphasizes state sovereignty and promotes non-interference. Peace operations consist of conflict settlement between states. Countries such as China

^{§§} The global centre here seems to refer to western liberal economies.

and India support this approach. The second group of countries (Western European countries) advocate for the post-Westphalian approach. With globalization, respect for sovereignty occurs only if the state does not violate the right of citizens. Post-Westphalian advocates see peace operations beyond the limits of states borders and emphasize the well-being of citizens. They regularly use peacekeeping to maintain or implement democracy and liberal economy.

The authors, in defining who the peacekeepers are, identify two main types of peacekeepers. First, international organizations, to include the UN, constitute the main providers of peacekeepers and possess the greatest legitimacy. However, because of the large demand, a second type of peacekeepers exists. Individual or multilateral states sponsor this type of peacekeepers.

The second part of the book covers the historical background of peace operations from the nineteenth century to the Cold War era. The early efforts of European powers to establish organizations and mechanisms to manage conflicts constitute the root of peace operations. In this regard, the authors identify the United Nations as a tool for the implementation of the “international order” that promotes a “status quo” in the hierarchical relationships between nations in favor of the world powers. The UN likely created peace operations in order to compensate after the failure to achieve collective security. The authors identify “quantitative, normative, and qualitative” transformations of UN peace operations that occur in the 1990s. These changes, however, were not followed by appropriate adjustments to the UN organization, structure, and institutional capacity. The lack of adjustments led to catastrophes that affected UN peace operations and diminished the global reputation of the organization. The twenty first century has

witnessed a positive change in UN peace operations. Following the failures in Rwanda and other operations, the UN made consistent efforts to make peace operations more credible. The Brahimi report^{***} contributed by improving decision-making, mandates, and resourcing, and the quick and effective deployment of peacekeepers.

The third part of the book defines the different types of peace operations: “preventive deployments,” “traditional peacekeeping,” “wider peacekeeping,” “peace enforcement,” “assisting transitions,” “transitional administrations” and “peace support.” The latter, combining civilian and strong military response supports the “post-Wesphalian” approach to peace operations in that it seeks to implement a liberal democracy.

The last part of *Understanding Peacekeeping* addresses the challenges for present and future peace operations. An interesting but cautionary aspect, is the possibility for the United Nations to use private companies to conduct UN peace operations. This prospect opens the opportunity of having private security companies accomplish certain missions in lieu of national military forces. Even though this possibility presents advantages, it carries many risks, one of which is the use of modern “mercenaries” for peace operations.

Understanding Peacekeeping is a solid book that provides the reader with a deep and clear understanding of peacekeeping. The authors methodically conduct a clear study of peace operations by providing historical context as well as clear conceptual definitions that help the reader understand the broader meaning of peacekeeping.

^{***} In 2000, Lakhdar Brahimi chaired a panel to identify the shortcomings of UN peace operations.

In The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping: Incentivizing Effective Participation, Katharina P. Coleman analyzes the economic structure of peacekeeping, identifies shortfalls in the disbursement procedures and makes recommendations to make peacekeeping disbursements an effective tool for incentivizing TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs).

In the first part of the book, Coleman provides a rich overview of the UN peacekeeping budget. The first interesting fact is that there is not such a UN peacekeeping budget. Instead, every year, the General Assembly approves four separate budgets for different aspects of peacekeeping: most active UN peace operations, the UN Logistics Base, the UN support account for peacekeeping operations, and the UN Support Office for the African Mission in Somalia since 2009. For example, in the 2013-2014 budget, the UN logistics Base budget was 68.5 million USD, the peacekeeping support account received 325 million USD, and the remainder of the budget, 7.15 billion USD (94.78 percent of the approved peace resources), went to specific peace operations. Approval for any new peace operations is balanced between the Security Council, that authorizes peace operations, and the General Assembly that approves budgets. This allows developing states, including many TCCs and PCCs, to influence decisions towards integration of their concerns. The disbursement process comprises three categories: military and police, civilian personnel and operational requirements. For military and police contingent members, the UN reimburses the TCC or PCC and it is up to the specific country to pay its peacekeepers with only the Force Commander, and a number of senior officers, employed by the UN. Staff officers, military observers, and civilian police officers are paid a daily “mission subsistence allowance” (MSA) ranging from 56

to 208 USD. The UN payments to TCCs and PCCs are of two forms: reimbursements for personnel costs 1028 USD/month^{†††} for each soldier or police personnel, and for contingent-owned equipment (COE). COE reimbursements follow either a “wet” or “dry” lease agreement. In the wet lease, which most TCCs follow, the country is responsible for maintaining equipment. Two types of agreements exist between the TCC/PCC and the UN before deployment: the memorandum of understanding (MOU) that specifies size and type of personnel and equipment and the letter of assist (LOA) for additional equipment or services. UN civilian personnel comprise international staff, national staff and UN volunteers. . As well, there are international staff who permanently employed by the UN, and national staff who are hired in the country, and unpaid UN volunteers. International staff are paid according to UN pay grades while national staff receive the equivalent of the highest national remuneration for their positions. UN volunteers receive living allowances, settling-in grants and various benefits. All the costs related to civilian personnel result from the budget available for each mission. Major financial contributors generally require having their nationals at key positions or they can delay payments. Operational requirements mostly include transportation, facilities, infrastructure, and self-sustainment costs for contingents. In this category, the UN privileges the use of contractors for transportation and other services.

The second part of *The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping: Incentivizing Effective Participation* focuses on the shortfalls of the financial incentive structure for TCCs and PCCs. First, low reimbursement rates do not compensate the deployment costs

^{†††} This amount was reviewed in 2014 and is now 1332 USD.
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml>.

for TCCs. In addition, troop reimbursements follow number of troops instead of troop quality, making countries less willing to deploy more qualified personnel. Secondly, current reimbursement procedures reimburse the use of equipment but not the acquisition. This makes states reluctant to purchase equipment for deployment purpose only. Moreover, once in theater, because the UN does not reimburse equipment that is not serviceable, countries avoid using their equipment as much as possible. Additionally, the use of commercially contracted aircrafts in UN missions, with a better reimbursement rate for the same type of military aircraft, discourage TCCs from contributing air assets. Thirdly, Coleman identifies six issues that impede UN incentivizing TCCs and PCCs: the small portion of peacekeeping resources allotted to TCCs and PCCs as compared to that for commercial contracts and civilian peacekeepers; the lack of financial motivation for countries' readiness; the complex process for adjusting reimbursement to increasing costs; the separate reimbursement process for personnel and equipment; arrears to the peacekeeping budget; the influence of states internal policies on incentive structure.

In the third part of this study, Coleman makes recommendations to improve the incentives for TCCs and PCCs in the short and long terms. One notable recommendation is to address the politicization of peacekeeping financing debates as well as recognizing the importance of developing countries in providing peacekeepers.

By conducting this study, Katharina P. Coleman has provided scholars and peacekeeping specialists with a very concise description of peacekeeping economics and its relationship with incentivizing TCCs and PCCs. The accurate identification of the different shortfalls of the current system and the recommendations are the first steps towards a better and more effective conduct of peace operations.

Peacekeeping in Africa

Adekeye Adebayo's *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez crisis to the Sudan Conflicts* is an assessment of peace operations in Africa. Through a chronological approach, Adebayo analyses peace operations in five regions: North Africa, the Great Lakes, Southern Africa, West Africa, and East Africa. One of the most notable suggestions of the book is the need for greater cooperation between the UN and local hegemons such as Nigeria and South Africa in achieving successful peace operations on the continent.

In chapter 1, Adebayo underlines how the Great Powers (permanent members of the UN Security Council) use peace operations as a tool to defend their individual states' national interests as well as the importance of the African Union and sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS. The author defines success as the achievement of "peace and stability to a particular case by implementing the key tasks of its stated mandate" (Adebayo 2011, 7) and emphasizes the importance of a strong political support and mutual agreement between "domestic, regional and external actors" in achieving success.

Chapter 2 covers the Suez crisis of 1956 and the UN mission in Western Sahara. The Suez crisis, which gave birth to the first armed UN peacekeeping operation, is the perfect illustration of Western Powers' collusions to defend their interests. While France and Great Britain were concerned about preserving their spheres of influence in the region, Israel wanted to secure its border with Egypt. The secret agreement between the three countries to organize an attack by Israel of Egypt and later a "peacekeeping" mission by France and Britain faced the opposition of the United States and the Soviet

Union who supported a common call for an Israeli withdrawal from Egypt. This course of action between two rival powers was notable, considering the relationship between the USA and its French and British allies.

A former Spanish colony, Western Sahara was divided between Mauritania and Morocco after Spanish forces were forced to leave the region under Moroccan military pressure. The POLISARIO Front started a guerilla warfare against Morocco and Mauritania for the independence of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Later, following internal crisis in Mauritania, Morocco became the sole occupying force in Western Sahara. In 1990, a plan by UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, provided for the establishment of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, in an effort to settle the disputes. However, the author notes that decreasing support for POLISARIO and the backing of Morocco by key UN veto-powers such as the United States and France, have delayed a referendum in Western Sahara on the independence of SADR. In this case, the interests of the Great Powers were an obstacle to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) achieving its goals.

The third chapter makes a historical analysis of crises and UN interventions in the Great Lakes region, the UN mission in Congo (1960-1964), the UN mission in Rwanda (1993-1994), the UN mission in Burundi (2004-2006) and the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (2000-2011). It is necessary to note that the author presents the Rwandan genocide with a strong criticism of Western Powers' actions and responsibilities in failing to prevent and even fueling the massive killings that occurred in front of disabused peacekeepers. The author highlights how the Security Council demonstrated a double standard in defining the legal framework in which two forces,

deployed on the same theater for the same peace mission, would operate; the French *Opération Turquoise* operated under a peace enforcement mandate while the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) struggled with a peacekeeping mandate. In a region with interlocking interests and ethnic groups, Adebayo effectively identifies the influence of regional cooperation between states in the region on the outcome of UN missions. It is, however, disappointing that the author does not clearly identify the economic interests of the Great Powers that justify their reluctance to put an end to a perpetual peacekeeping mission in the DRC. Finally, Adebayo calls for a strong financial and political support from the Security Council, as well as a regional approach, that would include Burundi and Rwanda in achieving effective peace in the DRC.

As he did in chapter 3 Adebayo provides a historical overview of UN peace operations in Southern Africa. Here again, he insists on the role that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council play on the success or failure of UN operations and initiatives. The strong support of Western powers to Apartheid South Africa, particularly that of the United States of America and Great Britain, delayed the peace talks in Namibia, in the fight of the country to achieve independence from Apartheid South Africa. Namibia soon became a field of Cold War confrontation. Notably, Cold War tactics influenced UN initiatives for peace in Namibia and the United Nations peacekeepers deployed to the country after the withdrawal, on specific US request, of Cuban forces from Angola. Angola and Mozambique, according to the author presented similarities. In each conflict, the presence of a warlord, Jonas Savimbi in Angola and Afonso Dhlakama, contributed respectively to the aggravation or denouement of the peace situation. Additionally, Adebayo points out the importance of a stronger, better-

resourced UN peacekeeping mission in achieving peace in Mozambique. However, the positive outcome in Angola was more difficult to achieve because of the ferocious resistance and opposition of Savimbi's strong rebel movement, UNITA. Finally, the author recognizes the multiple economic resources in Angola as a cause of the difficulties in solving the crisis without formally linking them to any Western Power.

West Africa is the focus of chapter 5. The author assesses the UN peace operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire with the view to determine whether UN intervention was successful or not. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the author emphasizes the important role played by ECOWAS, through ECOMOG, in driving the peace processes as opposed to Côte d'Ivoire where France's involvement at all stages of the peace enforcement process, by using the UN, aimed at protecting its interests in the country. The author criticized the delay that characterized UN involvement in Liberia during the first part of the peace operation. He points out that US pressure on the Security Council helped in conflict management during the second peacekeeping deployment in Liberia.

Similar to Liberia, the UN Security Council, Adebayo notes, purposely neglected the conflict in Sierra Leone, leaving ECOMOG to manage the peacekeeping effort, leading to a predictable failure. Great Britain's involvement, on the political and military sphere, triggered the UN to replace ECOMOG, and eventually achieved success in 2002. The author also mentions the role that Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso played in Liberia and Sierra Leone, backing rebels against ECOMOG and undermining sub regional efforts to build and maintain peace. Adebajo seems to deplore the persistent French influence in West Africa that competed with Nigeria. He characterized Nigeria as "France's

traditional rival in West Africa.” Adebajo, however, does not seem to relate the strong intervention of France in Côte d’Ivoire to its economic interests in the country since Cote d’Ivoire was the strongest economy among francophone countries in West Africa.

In the sixth chapter, Adebajo assesses peacekeeping in Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Darfur, and South Sudan. In all cases, he gives historical and detailed backgrounds on the conflicts, identifying the different actors and explaining the causes of conflicts. In Somalia, which the author identifies as a “cold war orphan,” the UN established the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to facilitate and secure the provision of food to populations facing famine. In 1993, UNOSOM II emerged from the ashes of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). This force comprised over 25,000 US soldiers and its mission was to secure the distribution of humanitarian goods. A unilateral US operation to capture key warlords in Mogadishu failed and resulted in the death of eighteen US soldiers and over a thousand civilians. US government and media blamed the UN. In 1995, all UN forces withdrew from Somalia, leaving it to chaos.

Unfortunately, one of the consequences of the disastrous mission in Liberia, Adebajo argues, is the immobility of the UN that contributed to the Rwandan genocide the following year. The author portrays the Ethiopia-Eritrea crisis as a perfect example of difficulties in solving a crisis due to the lack of will from the actors themselves, a crisis in which the opposing countries share so many cultural and historical ties. Additionally, the UN’s reluctance to get involved, leaving the OAU to manage the conflict despite obvious financial and logistical shortfalls, impeded the achievement of a sustainable solution. In Darfur and South Sudan, the author identifies the influence of the US, Britain and China, on the deployment of peacekeeping missions. Adebajo contrasts what he respectively

calls a “cynical abandonment” and “neglect” the missions in Somalia and Ethiopia-Eritrea, with the large deployment of peacekeepers in Darfur and South Sudan that he links to Western powers’ (external actors) interests.

In chapter 7, Adebayo proposes five solutions to improving peacekeeping on the continent and beyond. First, Adebajo advocates for a greater involvement of the permanent members of the Security Council in achieving success. He also points out the need for permanent representatives from Africa and Latin America. Second, the author recommends sharing responsibility between the UN and regional organizations combined with the designation of a single mediation team in order achieve effectiveness. Third, Adebajo calls for a greater role for local “hegemons” in Africa such as Nigeria and South Africa that would coordinate with “Lilliputian states.” Fourth, Adebajo calls for more firmness and effective sanctions against warlords that undermine the achievement of peace. The final recommendation stresses the appointment of effective UN representatives in order to conduct “adroit diplomacy” towards the resolution of crises.

Adebajo’s book is a well-written and well-documented book on peacekeeping in Africa. After reading *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez crisis to the Sudan Conflicts*, one gets an accurate vision of the problems that characterize the continent’s security environment as far as peacekeeping is concerned. The author makes good recommendations to improve future peace operations, one of which is the role of local hegemons such as Nigeria and South Africa. Nonetheless, Adebajo falls into the trap of tying size or population to credibility. On peacekeeping in West Africa for example, Ghana’s contribution and diplomatic efforts are considerable when assessed proportionally. As a “Lilliputian state,” Ghana’s contribution to regional and international

peacekeeping could equally earn it the same importance that Adebajo associates with Nigeria.

Jonah Victor's "African peacekeeping in Africa: Warlord politics, defense economics, and states legitimacy" analyses the reasons behind the increased participation of African countries. Using an empirical method and a quantitative analysis of 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2001, he points out three main reasons why African countries contribute to peacekeeping operations:

- Peacekeeping is a "diversionary strategy" used to support "regime survival"
- Financial and material gains motivate poorer African states to participate in Peacekeeping
- State legitimacy and territorial integrity explain certain states' contribution

Following the end of the Cold War, African states have increased their participation to peacekeeping. From an 8 percent participation in 1989, this proportion has reached 41 percent the following decade. The types of African states' involvement in peacekeeping vary from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement (United Nations' peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1993; Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone).

Victor refers to Reno's concept of "Warlord Politics" as opposed to "State-building" to explain how autocratic rulers fear for rebellions shape their approach to internal politics. By deploying troops in peacekeeping missions, such rulers gain double (Hypothesis 1). First, military leaders that are unsatisfied with the way internal politics are conducted could be tempted to overthrow a regime by a coup d'état. Peacekeeping missions keep them away from "home" and away from the temptation to take hostile

action against autocratic rulers. Second, autocratic leaders use troop contributions to peacekeeping operations to divert international attention on their misgovernment. By contributing, they avoid losing international aid (financially as well as military) that could hinder their regime's stability. Western powers would overlook dictatorship if the country participated in peacekeeping. Victor uses the examples of Nigeria during the rule of Sani Abacha, Guinea's participation in ECOMOG, and Ethiopia's purchase of North Korean arms in 2007 in violation of international sanctions, to illustrate his point. Moreover, major powers appreciate developing states troop contributions to peacekeeping because they do not have to use their own troops and avoid prospective internal opposition to deployment of national troops.

Victor assesses economic motivation for troop contribution (Hypothesis 2). He identifies the reimbursement made by the UN to TCCs (1000 USD/ soldier/month) and support to training and equipment prior to deployment" as important motivators. For poorer countries, this money supports the payment of salaries, "fund government functions, and . . . distribute adequate patronage" (Victor 2010, 221).

A state's level of "Horizontal legitimacy"^{†††} is the third aspect that Victor analyses. Due to the arbitrary design of African state borders determined by colonial powers, Victor argued that countries with low horizontal legitimacy tend to participate more to prevent separatist ethnic groups' actions against state unity (hypothesis 3).

Victor analyzes three more possible reasons why African states' contribute: larger contribution for larger states (hypothesis 4), lower contribution for countries involved in

^{†††} Level of agreement on what constitutes the politically defined community that underlies the state (Englebert 2000, 4).

internal or external conflicts (hypothesis 5), and larger contributions for former colonies of France and Great Britain (hypothesis 6).

In conclusion, Victor notes that hypotheses 1 and 4 are unconfirmed; hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 are confirmed. For hypothesis 6, Victor notes that it is only valid for former British colonies. Victor's study presents the advantage of addressing the topic of economic incentive to African countries participation. Moreover, although this research does not cover all the facets Victor mentioned, and analyzing recent developments in Burkina Faso,^{§§§} it can be assumed that its contribution to peacekeeping operations present similarities with the cases mentioned in hypotheses 1 and 2.

In *Darfur and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa*, Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Patrick Paterson, U.S. Navy, makes an analysis of UN peacekeeping in Africa with a focus on the Darfur crisis. LCDR Paterson's approached these topics mainly from a U.S. perspective and he painted a pessimistic picture of peacekeeping in Africa and the capability of African countries, through the African Union (AU), to maintain or enforce peace on the continent. The author reviews briefly the history of African Peacekeeping^{****} by exploring U.S. support to security through financial contributions to UN operations as well as foreign assistance and humanitarian efforts on the continent.

^{§§§} In October 2014, a countrywide uprising led to former president Blaise Compaore fleeing the country. The protest was consecutive to President Compaore's attempt to amend the constitution to allow him to run for another term in 2015.

^{****} The use of the term "African Peacekeeping" by the author is not clear as to if it refers to peacekeeping on the African Continent or to peacekeeping by African peacekeepers.

The 2004 AU's decision to establish the ASF, which would rapidly deploy in the occurrence of a humanitarian crisis or disaster, has had mixed results.

Following the Darfur genocide, the A.U peacekeeping troops began arriving in 2004, a year after rebel groups attacked military posts. The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) faced various difficulties, ranging from logistics to intelligence collection, which led to the failure of this first AU intervention. In 2006, the UN and the AU agreed that the UN would take over the peacekeeping mission in Darfur. After initial reluctance from the Sudanese government, the UN, the AU, and the Sudanese government came to an agreement for the deployment for an international mission in the region in 2007.

Overall, the Sudanese government continuously impeded smooth conduct of the mission by various requirements and the rejection of peacekeepers from some countries.^{††††}

Considering the many difficulties of African peacekeepers, the US has offered to train and equip contributing countries' troops in Africa in 2007 for up to 47.5 million USD. On the continent, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) under US Africa Command (AFRICOM) supervision aimed at developing and improving African military capabilities in view of peace operations and humanitarian relief operations as well as improving interoperability among African partners. Interesting enough, many of the African countries involved have poor human rights records and the author notes the risk of such militaries conducting atrocities against their own populations.

^{††††} Norway, Sweden, Nepal, Thailand.

Peacekeeping in Africa and by African peacekeepers from the author's perspective has been a failure. This work, even though it gives an outstanding insight of US contributions to peacekeeping, blames African countries for poor peacekeeping capabilities without analyzing the objective reasons behind the situation: most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are poor and can barely provide food, education, and adequate health care for their populations. Peacekeeping is important but this work fails to understand the obvious prioritizations that developing countries must establish for their survival.

In Help Yourself: Recent Trends in African Peacekeeping in Africa, Nikolas Emmanuel analyzes the advantages and drawbacks of the use of African peacekeepers in Africa and seeks to determine the African hegemons' contribution to a safe and secure Africa. Emmanuel identifies cultural and geographic, cost and national security as advantages to African peacekeepers in Africa. On the other hand, he emphasized that African countries have limited resources to support military operations and noted the risk of impartiality during these operations. By analyzing TCCs statistics in 10 peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa between 2007 and 2014, the author identified the hegemons (Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda). His study offers an interesting perspective on the participation of some African countries in peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa.

Peacekeeping with focus on the economic impact:
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nepal

In Peacekeeping, a New Challenge for Burkina Faso's Armed Forces, Gansonre provides an overview of Burkina Faso's recent engagement in peace operations. Colonel

Gansonre is a senior Officer serving in the BFAF and has had a lot of experience in command. In his manuscript, he gives an overview of the reasons why Burkina Faso's involvement in peace operations was necessary. His study covers conflicts in Africa, reasons for Burkina Faso's involvement in peacekeeping and challenges that the country encounters in this orientation. Colonel Gansonre reviews recent conflicts in Africa and reveals the causes of "internal turbulences" (Gansonre 2013, 2) that impede the development of the continent. He analyzes the security environment in Africa where non-state armed groups, often with considerable financial means, jeopardize security on the continent, from West to East and North to Central Africa. According to Colonel Gansonre, Burkina Faso, with its "political stability, culture and unique geographical position, is now playing the role of mediator to quell disputes between fratricide factions in West Africa. It has decided in addition to diplomatic endeavors to join the Peacekeeping Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) but with predictable difficulties" (Gansonre 2013). Gansonre argued the BFAF needed to make internal security a priority before seeking a long lasting involvement in peacekeeping. Shortfalls in BFAF structure, force management, and training affect the balance that it must maintain between internal involvement and national requirements. Gansonre concluded by identifying internal stability, efficient training, professionalism and standing doctrine and legal frameworks as prerequisites to a successful involvement in peacekeeping operations.

In Why Contribute? Understanding Asian Motivations for Troop Contribution to Peace Operations, Xenia Avezov analyzes the reasons driving South and Northeast Asian TCCs' participation to peace operations. Drawing conclusions from workshops with representatives from various sectors of TCCs of the region, Avezov examines, among

other topics, national motivations for contributions to peace operations. She conducts an interesting study of the relationship between a country's level of development and its contribution to peacekeeping. An interesting contrast characterizes smallest countries. While larger countries (considering country's size of economy and military) such as Pakistan and India, contribute more personnel, the proportion of their personnel participating in peace operations is much smaller than that Nepal and Mongolia.

Among motivations for contribution, Avezov identifies six main categories: national economy, military, domestic politics, international politics, domestic security, and normative incentives. Considering national economic motivations, Avezov stated that UN compensation for peacekeeping missions benefited both individual troops and their governments. This motivation is less important for Pakistan and India. Moreover, economics remains an important incentive in that it creates attractiveness for foreign investment and friendliness towards TCCs. The military aspect of motivation closely relates to economic motivation. It emphasizes the impact of UN compensation in TCCs militaries through reinvestment. The domestic-political category assesses the positive public opinion the military acquires. In addition to improving civil-military relationships, it is also a way for countries to express friendship with other nations and to participate in diplomacy.

The last category, international politics, covers a TCC's geostrategic benefits. It stipulates that countries gain international recognition, influence and even a say in international decision-making by providing peacekeepers. Contribution is a tool to achieve strategic, international, and diplomatic objectives. It can improve relationships with the host country or support competition against other countries.

Finally, participation can be a result of a formal commitment between two countries whereby a country will contribute to support an ally. Avezov analyzes also how contribution supports regional and/or national security concerns. The closer the threat, the more likely a country would be willing to contribute. Normative considerations relate to countries' commitment to international humanitarian or development agendas. Furthermore, countries that have suffered instability will more often be willing to participate.

With a focus on country clusters, Avezov studied three countries with similarities when it comes to participation to peacekeeping: Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Besides being large contributors, these countries share a common experience of civil and regional conflict. They are also working towards economic stability and democratization. Economic returns are strong incentive for the three countries, both for the military and the national economy. In Bangladesh and Nepal for example, troop reimbursements constitute a considerable incentive for the individual soldiers as well as the military. Individual soldiers earn up to ten times what they could earn as civilians. Participating armies also draw from financial returns to fund defense budget and provide welfare services for soldiers. All three countries view participation as a way to improve civil military relations, professionalism and improve the international image of the military while preventing military intervention in politics. The Bangladesh constitution affirms its commitment to global peace. Avezov concludes the study of this cluster by identifying economic and military considerations as the strongest motivating factors.

Avezov continues with a study of other Asian TCCs (Pakistan, India and China, Japan and South Korea and Mongolia). In summary:

1. Political and foreign affairs motivate Pakistan's participation; the rivalry with India also plays an important role.
2. India and China: India values the economic benefits and seeks to increase its influence at the UN; China wants to project its international influence and image as well as to reassure its neighbors of its commitment to peace.
3. Japan and South Korea: Both countries are developed and economically strong. International and security considerations as well as their commitment to their allies inspire their contributions. Their contributions, however, are relatively small due to lack significant economic and military gains.
4. Mongolia stands out because, despite its small size and relatively low economic power, its reasons for participation are political and security-oriented. Located between China and Russia, two nuclear powers, Mongolia sees participation as a way to build relationship with larger countries and maintaining a balance between its neighbors. Economic motivation exists, but it is a secondary concern.

Avezov's work on South and Northeast countries is revealing. Economy is an important motivation for poorer countries. Peacekeeping offers opportunities for countries with recent instability and crises to keep their military "busy," thus, preventing them from interfering with internal politics. On the other hand, peace operations are a strong diplomatic tool that helps a TCC support various purposes, from strengthening relationships with other countries to leveraging international and political influence. For developed countries, peacekeeping is less an economic opportunity than a diplomatic

tool. In addition, the more developed a country is, the less motivated it is in contributing to peace operations.

In “Ghana,” Kwesi Aning and Festus K. Aubyn analyze peacekeeping in the former “Gold Coast”^{****} from its first participations to UN operations in 1960 to present. This historical and analytical study of Ghana’s involvement in UN peace operations provides a solid overview of the motivating factors for Ghana’s contribution, the decision-making mechanisms that the country performs before sending troops to UN peacekeeping missions, current and future trends of peacekeeping and lessons learned.

The authors identify three main reasons behind Ghana’s participation to peacekeeping: regional and sub-regional security challenges and interests, the commitment to support international peace and security, and financial and operational gains. “Ghana” provides interesting and quantifiable details of the country’s gains from UN peacekeeping.

Kwesi Aning and Festus K. Aubyn describe in detail the decision-making process before troops are sent to peacekeeping missions. They also identify who are the key actors at the strategic and operational level, the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) and the Ghana Police Service (GPS). This section unveils that a threat assessment is conducted prior to any mission in order to determine the impact of such commitment on the national security as well as on the providing institution (GAF or GPS).

In their perspective, the authors see Ghana maintaining or increasing their current contribution in the future in spite of logistical challenges. They therefore recommend an

^{****} Former name of Ghana.

upgrade of current military equipment in order to sustain such policy in regards to contributing troops to UN peace operations.

Finally, “Ghana” portrays a generally attractive picture of Ghana’s involvement in peacekeeping. Particularly, the authors think other countries could learn from the payment procedures of Ghanaian troops that they deem equitable and well elaborate. However, they do not provide details of the percentage that troops receive from the UN reimbursement for personnel costs. A more comprehensive explanation could have better supported this assertion.

All in all, Kwesi Aning and Festus K. Aubyn’s work is an important tool for African and other developing countries that are engaging in UN peacekeeping operations. It is also a consistent tool for scholars studying peace operations in general.

In “Nepal,” Arturo Sotomayor provides a comprehensive description of the country’s long lasting commitment to UN peacekeeping. The author starts by giving a historical account of Nepal’s involvement in peacekeeping from the end of the Cold War to 2010. He then continues to analyze Nepal rationales for contributing as a top TCC. This section identifies Nepal’s motivations to contribute at three levels, political, institutional, and economic. Sotomayor does not avoid the challenges facing Nepal peacekeeping efforts and focuses on the difficulties that could impede the country’s reputation as a TCC as well as its very capacity to continue contributing large numbers of troops.

Sotomayor gives an honest description of peacekeeping in Nepal. The real value of his work resides in the assessment that he makes of the challenges facing Nepalese Army’s involvement in peacekeeping. At the end of “Nepal,” the reader clearly identifies

the main challenge of Nepal's contribution to UN peacekeeping: the need to maintain international credibility as a TCC that can provide professional and qualified peacekeepers.

Summary

Chapter 3 focused on an overview of existing literature on peacekeeping at three levels: understanding peacekeeping from a conceptual perspective, exploring peacekeeping in Africa and analyzing peacekeeping with a focus on the research question.

The first part of the literature showed that different scholars and different countries viewed peacekeeping from different or even opposing perspectives. It also provided the necessary historical background for the researcher. Finally, it described the economic side of UN peace operations. This step was necessary to address the research question.

The second part of the literature review explored peacekeeping in Africa. As the continent where majority of Burkinabè peacekeepers are currently serving, it provided a deeper understanding of the history of peacekeeping on the continent, the causes of conflicts, and the ongoing debate on the effectiveness of UN peace operations.

The last part of the literature focused on the research question. It covered peacekeeping in Burkina Faso and in similar TCCs with a focus on the rationales for contributing and the economic impact of peacekeeping.

In chapter 3, the research will outline the methodology that he used to answer the research questions.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter develops the research methodology used to analyze the economic impact of peacekeeping operations in Burkina Faso. This research paper focuses first on the economic impact in terms of financial returns for the national economy, based on UN reimbursements for troops and equipment. Second, it assesses the economic impact on the individual BFAF soldier, with the view to ascertain whether financial gain is a motivator to the country's participation.

A mixed research methodology was used for this research. Scholars often characterize the mixed research methodology as “integrating, synthesis, quantitative and qualitative methods, multimethod, and mixed methodology” (Creswell 2014). This methodology involves the collection and analysis of qualitative and quantitative data, and each method answers some of the secondary research questions to provide an exhaustive understanding of the primary research question.

Qualitative research consists of a study and analysis of the way individuals or groups understand and perceive the causes of a given problem. By raising questions and analyzing data from the target individual or group, the researcher uses an inductive approach to draw pertinent conclusions. Qualitative research provides a better visibility over complex situations (Creswell 2014).

Quantitative research seeks to assess the validity of a theory by examining the relationship between variables through statistical analysis. The results of the analysis are

discussed in relation to the initial assumptions in order to unveil objective and replicable findings through a deductive approach (Creswell 2014).

The methodology used for this research is the convergent parallel mixed method. The qualitative approach studied the economic impact at the national level and the quantitative approach analyzed economic impact at the individual soldier's level. The combination of the conclusions of each approach then provided answers to the primary research question.

It is important to note that the researcher is a BFAF officer, and he has participated in peacekeeping with MINUSMA, from 2014 to 2015 as a staff officer at the Burkina Faso battalion Headquarters in Timbuktu, Mali. As a result, personal knowledge of the social dynamics within the BFAF, the financial impact of peacekeeping operations, as well as his perception of the importance of financial remuneration of peacekeeping missions by the researcher could bias the study. To minimize the risk of biased analysis or interpretation, the researcher avoided referring to personal experience and acquired quality objective data to conduct the study.

The qualitative approach

Marshall asserts that before engaging in a study that uses qualitative methods, a researcher should assess three parameters: feasibility, competence and ethics, and interest. The researcher ought to make sure he has the necessary resources to conduct the study successfully, verify that the research is profitable to the specific discipline, and show interest and commitment in the chosen topic (Marshall and Rossman 2016, 4).

The qualitative approach addressed the first variable by seeking to answer the following secondary research questions:

1. Are there economical motivations to Burkina Faso's participation to peacekeeping operations?
2. Does Burkina Faso reinvest in BFAF?

The case studies

Case studies are valuable because they provide an analytical framework and context. They allow flexibility by offering various “perspectives, data collection tools, and interpretive strategies” (Marshall and Rossman 2016, 19). Leedy and Ormrod argue that case studies are appropriate when there is little knowledge or understanding of a given situation. They can also be a good method to analyze changes of individuals or programs over a certain period (Leedy and Ormrod 2005, 135). In order to obtain more reliable and accurate conclusions, it is preferable to use a multiple case design. Multiple cases reflect multiple experiences and are more valuable for replication. The researcher therefore selects cases with the view to obtain analogous or contrasting results (Rowley 2002, 21). Analyzing case studies results is certainly the most difficult step of the research. One effective method is for the researcher to conduct the analysis in a way that allows him to answer the questions or to achieve the objectives of the study. This method is ideal because it allows the researcher to collect data that will achieve the objective of the study and corroborate or invalidate the initial hypotheses (Rowley 2002, 24).

Choice of variables and explanation

Several works on TCCs identify different rationales for contributing to peacekeeping. The data collection on the economic impact of peace operations directed the choice of the variables. This study used the following variables in order to answer the

secondary questions: the size of the TCC's economy, economic motivation to contribute and reinvestment in the Armed Forces.

Size of TCC's economy

This criterion will help determine the correlation between the country's economy and its motivation to contribute to peace operations. Many of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping are developing countries. As of December 2015, nine of ten top UN TCCs were either low or lower-middle economies. Furthermore, out of the top twenty UN TCCs, only China, South Africa, and Jordan are not a low or lower-middle economy (United Nations 2015) (The World Bank 2016d). For example, financial benefit is the primary driver of majority of Asian TCCs large participation. The size of the country's economy defines the size of the contribution. Poorer countries contribute more and richer countries contribute less as they do not see peace operations as a source of revenue but as political or diplomatic tool (Avezov 2014, 280).

In assessing this characteristic, the researcher will use the following rating: a weaker economy (low or lower middle) will receive a (+), and a strong economy will receive a (-).

Economic motivation to contribute

This characteristic will help determine if the financial factor motivated the country's decision to contribute, to maintain, or to increase its participation to peace operations. In developing countries, economic rationales are the primary motivators of large contributions. However, economic motivations tend to lose their importance in TCCs with a stronger economy (Avezov 2014, 266). UN remunerations include both

reimbursement for equipment to the TCC as well as monthly payment for peacekeepers. Sri Lanka for instance has gained 142 million USD from participating in UN peacekeeping. It used 47 million USD to purchase equipment for the military, training soldiers and supporting the country's economy (Avezov 2014, 266). Aside of this direct profit, countries also gain indirectly by using peacekeeping as a tool to obtain funding and external investment. Though this aspect is more difficult to assess, countries like Ghana, which received 2 million USD from China in 2005 to invest in their armed forces (Aning 2007, 137), see it as a great opportunity.

This variable is assessed by determining if the country's economic gain is a reason for the large contribution to peace operations. A rating (+) will be given if the answer is "yes," a rating (0) if it cannot be determined and a rating (-) if the answer is "no."

Reinvestment in Armed Forces

This variable will help determine if the government reinvests the money in the military. Many of the African TCCs who are top contributors are low-income countries that face difficulties funding their military interventions. Moreover, the high logistical demand of deploying a force as well as other factors such as intelligence collection required significant resources that many of the African TCCs lack (Emmanuel 2014, 8). The pecuniary benefits from UN peacekeeping mission are therefore a substantial means for equipment acquisition for the Armed Forces as it is in Ghana's case. In Nepal, the financial remittances of UN peacekeeping allow the country to provide medical, educational, and humanitarian support to veterans (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016b).

For this variable, evidence of reinvestment of UN financial profit in the military is rated (+), (0) if reinvestment cannot be determined and (-) if there is no reinvestment for the military.

Selection of Research Case Studies

Having identified the variables, the researcher chose Ghana and Nepal for an in-depth study. The choice of the two case studies focused on countries that present similarities on the following criteria: size of military; economy; and a high level of contribution to peace operations. Ghana is a neighboring country of Burkina Faso. It has a long experience in peace operations. Its first participation to UN peacekeeping occurred in the early 1960s in Congo-Kinshasa and since then it has been a regular contributor (Aoi et al. 2007, 134). Nepal is a landlocked country in South Asia. Its contribution to UN peace operation has been consistent for decades. Nepal first participated to a UN Mission in 1958 with the UN Military Observation Group in Lebanon (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016b) and still contributes today.

The researcher analyzes similarities between Ghana and Nepal and compares the two cases studies with Burkina Faso.

The following matrix depicts the scoring process for each case study.

Table 1. Grading of Variables

Country	Size of economy	Economic motivation to contribute	Reinvestment in Armed Forces
Ghana	(+) or (-)	(+) or (0) or (-)	(+) or (0) or (-)
Nepal	(+) or (-)	(+) or (0) or (-)	(+) or (0) or (-)
Burkina Faso	(+) or (-)	(+) or (0) or (-)	(+) or (0) or (-)

Source: Created by author.

For the variable “Size of economy,” a weaker economy receives a (+), and a strong economy receives a (-). For the variable “Economic motivation to contribute,” a (+) is given if economy is a rationale for contributing, a (0) if it cannot be determined and a (-) if economy is NOT a rationale for contributing. For the variable “Reinvestment in Armed Forces,” evidence of reinvestment in the military is rated (+), impossibility to determine is rated (0), and absence of reinvestment is rated (-).

The quantitative approach

The quantitative approach answers the following research questions:

1. What does the individual soldier gain financially through participation to peacekeeping operations?
2. Is financial gain a motivation for soldiers’ participation to peacekeeping operations?

To answer these two questions, the researcher conducted a survey to define measurable “trends, attitudes, or opinions of a population by studying a sample of that population” (Creswell 2014). The survey used Creswell’s framework as it applies to a specific topic.

Survey design

The survey's purpose was to determine the impact that peacekeeping remuneration has on individual soldiers. In order to develop generalized conclusions this data should assist in assessing if peacekeeping money had an influence on Burkina Faso's increased participation in peace operations.

This survey was a cross-sectional survey of members of the BFAF based on the current UN remunerations and national salary. The parameters the survey used are variable over time.

The survey consisted of a questionnaire that volunteers received by email, responded to the questions, and returned to the researcher by email. Given the small size of BFAF, the researcher personally knows a considerable number of soldiers. The researcher invited selected participants by email to take the survey on a voluntary basis.

This method had several advantages. First, the use of email provided a cheaper solution to the use of regular mail that could generate costs to the researcher. The second advantage was time. The use of this method saved a considerable amount of time and mitigated the limitations mentioned in chapter 1. Finally, this method allowed the researcher to reach out to a large number of participants. Despite the advantages, the use of email presented a risk in confidentiality in case the participant or the researcher's email was hacked. To mitigate this risk, information that could reveal a participant's identity was not included in the survey. Moreover, after extraction of the completed questionnaire, the researcher deleted all emails as an additional precaution and protection measure for the subjects.

Population and sampling

The target population for the survey is made of soldiers, including officers, Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted, that have participated in UN peacekeeping operations. At the time of this research, seven successive battalions of 800 BFAF soldiers have deployed to UNAMID and four battalions of 850 to MINUSMA (three in Timbuktu and one in Diabaly). These numbers do not account for the staff officers and military observers that have deployed in several UN missions globally. Despite the fact that some soldiers have participated in several missions, it was still difficult to extend the survey to the entire population. Considering that remuneration in UN mission for contingents are identical and that differences in MSA from one theater to another are minimal, the selection of the sample considered any soldier that has participated in a UN peacekeeping operation as member of a contingent, staff officer or military observer.

The researcher used a single stage sampling. This type of sampling is used when the researcher has access to the names of the target participants and can select them directly (Creswell 2014). The researcher targeted a 40-soldier sample but obtained 69 responses for this study. The sample was determined through stratification at two levels: officers constituted one group and other ranks^{§§§§} constituted the second group. This stratification took into account the fact that only officers can serve as staff officers or military observers.^{*****} Additionally, because the researcher is an officer, it was easier for him to contact his peers for this research. Table 2 shows the composition of the sample.

^{§§§§} “Other Ranks” refers to NCOs and Enlisted personnel.

^{*****} There are other ranks who participate as drivers or security personnel to VIPs. However their number is very minimal and therefore is negligible.

Table 2. Sample description

	Officers	Other ranks	TOTAL
UN contingent	12	45	57
UN Staff officer or Military Observer	12	N/A	12
TOTAL	24	45	69

Source: Created by author.

The research variables

Table 3 shows the research variables as they relate to the research questions in the quantitative study.

Table 3. Research variables

Variables	Secondary research question	Survey question
Category of the participant	Question 5	Question 1, 2, 3, 4
Types of UN mission	Question 5	Question 1, 2, 3, 4
Monthly Remuneration	Question 5	Question 1, 2, 3, 4
Motivation to participate in future missions	Question 6	Question 5, 6, 7, 8

Source: Created by author.

Instrumentation

The researcher developed a questionnaire for the purpose of this research. The full version of the questionnaire is in Appendix A.

Data analysis and interpretation

This step will first present the information collected by responses according to the variables in order to provide an overall visibility of the outcome of the survey. A table will include numbers and percentages for each variable and a descriptive analysis will offer an understanding of the outcome. Finally, by reading the information provided, the researcher will draw conclusions according to the research questions that were the object of the quantitative study as well as discussing implications of the results (Creswell 2014).

Summary

In chapter 3, the researcher laid out the methodology used for the study, which consists of a convergent parallel mixed method. The first part will be a qualitative analysis through a case study of Ghana and Nepal with the view to answer the first two secondary research questions. In this process, three variables were identified: the size of the TCC's economy, economic motivation to contribute and reinvestment in the Armed Forces. The second part uses a quantitative analysis to determine the financial gain for individual soldiers. Through an eleven-question survey, the researcher will analyze the effect UN remunerations have on individual soldiers and if thus, deduce if it constitutes a motivation for the country to contribute.

Chapter 4 conducts an in-depth analysis of the case studies as well as the survey results to determine the economic impact of peacekeeping in Burkina Faso.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter analyses the economic impact of peace operations on Burkina Faso. The analysis follows the structure developed in chapter 3. The first part is a qualitative study. It focuses on the economic impact of peace operations in the country as well as the Armed forces of Burkina Faso. The second part is a quantitative study of the economic impact on the individual soldier.

The qualitative study

To analyze the impact of peacekeeping operations the qualitative examinations will consist of two cases studies, Ghana and Nepal. This analysis seeks to answer the first of two secondary questions by assessing each country's financial and economic motivations to contribute. As well, there is an in-depth analysis of each of these countries involvement in peace operations with a focus on their economic gain from a large-scale contribution.

The economic impact of peacekeeping: a case study of GHANA

Background

“If peacekeeping was an exportable commodity, Ghana would have been a rich country by amassing a huge amount of money from it” (Afele 2000). This statement alone summarizes the country's level of commitment to peace operations. Ghana first contributed troops to UN peacekeeping in 1960 when it sent a contingent as part of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Since then, the West African country has consistently been a force provider to several UN peace missions (Aning and Aubyn

2013, 269). Today, Ghana provides 3247 uniformed peacekeepers on eleven United Nation peacekeeping missions, making it the world's eighth largest contributor and the fourth largest African contributor. It also provides helicopters in various peacekeeping theaters for transportation as well as multirole missions (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016a).

In 2014, Ghana's defense budget was 277 million USD, which represent 0.78 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The active GAF are estimated to be 15,500 personnel. The GAF is comprised of the Ghana Army (GA) with 11,500 personnel, the Ghana Navy (GN) with 2,000 personnel, and the Ghana Air Force (GHF) with 2,000 personnel (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016a). In spite of the dominant proportion of military personnel and police forces from the GPS among Ghana's peacekeepers, a notable number of Ghanaian politicians and diplomats have actively and still participate in peace negotiations where needed. Ghana's commitment to peace and democracy has not only focused on Africa, but also has expanded to other countries on other continents such as Kosovo in Europe and Afghanistan in Asia (Aning and Aubyn 2013, 272). Ghana has been one of the world's top ten contributors to peace keeping for almost fifty years. It is likely that Ghana will maintain or increase its level of contribution in the future despite logistical difficulties and training constraints (Aning and Aubyn 2013, 287).

Size of Economy

Ghana's economy is among the most promising in Africa. Its key sectors are services, mining, and agriculture, mainly the export of cocoa. The recent exploitation of oil resources has significantly contributed to increase Ghana's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - West Africa 2016). However, in spite of a

diverse economic structure and significant efforts to strengthen its economy, Ghana is still among the smaller economies in the world. Its GDP in 2014 was 38,617 million USD and ranked 91st in the world. In 2016, the World Bank's ranking of countries identified Ghana as a lower-middle income economy with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of 1,590 USD in 2014 (The World Bank 2016b).

Ghana, despite a growing and promising economy is still a relatively small economy. As such, when evaluating Ghana's economy based on the methodology outlined in chapter 3, the criteria is determined as positive (+).

Economic motivation to contribute

One of the main rationales for Ghana's sustained and large contribution to UN peace operations is the financial benefits. They can be classified as direct benefits from UN reimbursement and indirect gains from participation in peace operations.

The direct benefits that Ghana receives motivate not only the nation but also the individual soldier. The compensation offered by the UN for troops and equipment provides a considerable amount of financial resources for the GAF and the GPS. For example, the Ghana aviation unit operating with MINUSMA earns 900,000 USD per month. This type of contribution can have a significant impact on a country with a developing economy (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016a). Moreover, in 2010, the total compensation received for peace operations was 74,336,121.42 USD. After deducting the peacekeeping 'expenditures', Ghana's "profit" was 32,235,544.95 USD (Aning and Aubyn 2013, 276). For individual soldiers, the monthly reimbursement offered by the UN constitute a considerable source of additional revenue. Ghanaian officers for example,

purchase houses, cars, and improve their general living conditions with the financial returns of their participation in UN peace operations (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016a).

Indirect benefits are funding not coming directly from the UN but coming from other countries or institutes which benefits the country or its military. Ghana's indirect benefits from peacekeeping are also significant to the economy. Ghana has used its enormous contribution to peacekeeping worldwide to gain foreign investment in the GAF. For example, in 2004, Ghana received approximately 1.5 million USD (10 million Yuan) in support of its role in peacekeeping and a 2 million-USD value equipment from China (Aning 2007, 137). Ghana also received 4 million USD in 2003 from the US government, for its "peace initiatives in the West African sub-region," and over 3.4 million dollars' worth equipment and training through the ACOTA program (Aning 2007, 138).

Ghana, despite having a relatively small military, has remained among the world top contributors to peacekeeping for over fifty years and received considerable income from peace operations. Ghana's profits are both effective through direct UN reimbursement as well as indirect influx of money in support of the country's peace efforts. Considering these factors, when evaluating the Ghanaian economic motivation to contribute as outlined in the chapter 3 methodology, this variable is rated as positive (+).

Reinvestment in Armed Forces

The financial contribution to Ghanaian economy, attributable to its participation to peace operations, is considerable. The monetary benefits from peace operations have boosted the country's defense budget and allowed the acquisition of military equipment and aircraft (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016a). These equipment and aircraft contribute

to improve the Armed Forces operations as well as support the peacekeeping efforts. The impact of financial returns is so important that it allowed the Armed Forces to acquire a presidential aircraft in 1999 (Aning and Aubyn 2013, 276).

Ghana invests the money received from its participation to peacekeeping, mostly in acquisition of new equipment. Therefore, when evaluating this against the criteria outlined in chapter 3, the reinvestment in the Armed Forces is (+).

Table 4 synthetizes the scoring of the variables of the case study of Ghana.

Table 4. Scoring of variables for the analysis of Ghana

Serial	Variables	Ghana
(a)	(b)	(c)
1	Size of economy	(+)
2	Economic motivation to contribute	(+)
3	Reinvestment in Armed Forces	(+)

Source: Created by author.

The economic impact of peacekeeping: a case study of NEPAL

Background

Nepal is a relatively small country, located between two Asian superpowers, India and China. Nepal was a functioning monarchy for 240 years until 1996, when the Maoists sparked an insurrection that ended in 2006 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and their integration into a Nepali democratic republic. Nepal's geopolitical situation has strongly influenced its foreign politics, focused on maintaining a neutral stand with its

two rival neighbors (Sotomayor 2014, 291). Nepal's first participation in UN peacekeeping occurred in 1958, three years after its membership in the United Nations, when they sent five observers to Lebanon as part of the UN Military Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016b). Since then, Nepal has consistently provided peacekeepers to several UN missions all over the world and is today the sixth world's largest contributor to peace operations with 5,084 peacekeepers^{†††††} (United Nations 2016a). These numbers, when compared to the 95,750 active armed forces personnel, represent a significant contribution to UN peacekeeping. Additionally, Nepal provides nine multi-role and three transport helicopters. The country's defense budget in 2012 was estimated at 239 million USD (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016b). Even though Nepal's participation to UN peace operations fluctuated in the 90s along with national instability, the growth of its contribution during the past decade seems to be supported by its resolve to acquire credibility on the international stage (Sotomayor 2014, 296). Nepali peacekeepers have been on the international spotlights in 2010 when an outbreak of cholera in Haiti caused over 6000 deaths. Subsequent investigations uncovered that poor sanitary and waste management systems had caused the epidemics. This crisis negatively affected Nepalese peacekeeping (Sotomayor 2014, 308). Despite several challenges at the national level and past failures, Nepal is likely going to maintain a high level of contribution to UN peace operations.

^{†††††} UN ranking as of 31 December 2015.

Nepal's economy

Nepal is one of the poorest country in South Asia with a GNI per Capita of 659.5 USD in 2015 (Government of Nepal Ministry of Finance 2016). Agriculture is the principal sector and represents a large share in production and employment. However, the sector suffers the consequences of a growing population along with disjointed economic policies. In addition to agriculture, Nepal has a relatively small industrial sector focused on carpets and textiles and a recently growing tourism sector, following the end of the civil war. The civil war, however, has caused a large emigration of the Nepalese labor force throughout the world. This diaspora's remittances have contributed significantly to the economy (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment–South Asia 2016). The World Bank ranked Nepal 108th in the world with a GDP of 19,770 million USD in 2016. This economic performance positions Nepal as a low-income economy (The World Bank 2016c). Therefore, for this criterion, Nepal's economy receives a rating (+).

Economic motivation to contribute

The economic gain that is derived from large contributions to peace operations constitutes an incentive for Nepalese at both the institutional and individual level. Sotomayor argues that three main economic motivations support Nepal's increased participation in peace operations. First, following the end of the monarchy in Nepal in 2006, the Armed Forces feared to be under Maoist leadership and were placed under the control of the parliament. This general uncertainty led the Armed Forces to seek justifications for raising and maintaining a 90,000-men Army (Sotomayor 2014, 304).

Second, the Army became an alternate source of revenue as tourism shrank and the Nepalese government found it hard to support a large army. As well, financial gain became an incentive for many individuals to join the military (Sotomayor 2014, 304).

Third, the Nepalese Army benefits from peacekeeping as an institution. While certain TCCs directly disburse peacekeeping individual reimbursements to soldiers, Nepal's Army has deducted from 50 percent in 2004 and is currently deducting 25 percent to support its own expenses. For example, in 2010, the UN paid an estimated 60 million USD for Nepalese soldiers. This represented a quarter of the Nepalese Army budget (Sotomayor 2014, 304). Considering a deduction rate of 25 percent, the Army gained 15 million USD from soldier's participation. This amount does not include the larger reimbursements for COE. For the individual soldier, the salary that he received from UN peacekeeping is up to five times higher than what he gets in his country (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016b).

Given the positive impact participating in peace operations has on the Nepal military and the country's economic system, Nepal receives a rating (+) for this criterion.

Reinvestment in Armed Forces

Nepal has established a formal tool to reinvest its financial gains acquired from UN peace operations for the soldiers. The Nepalese Army Welfare Program, funded by deductions from UN allowances and other reimbursements, provides medical, educational, and humanitarian support to veterans and their families (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016b). Sotomayor asserts that UN reimbursement has allowed Nepal to support operational costs and maintain a large force in the face of modernization and structural challenges (Sotomayor 2014, 305).

As the revenues received by the Nepalese Army Welfare Program, directly benefit Nepal's military, the criterion receives a positive rating (+).

Table 5. Scoring of variables for the analysis of Nepal

Serial	Variables	Nepal
(a)	(b)	(c)
1	Size of economy	(+)
2	Economic motivation to contribute	(+)
3	Reinvestment in Armed Forces	(+)

Source: Created by author.

Relevance to peacekeeping in Burkina Faso

An overview

The Ghana and Nepal case studies serve as comparative examples of the current and potential impact of UN peace operations could be in Burkina Faso. It is difficult to determine the profit that Burkina Faso makes after deducting all expenses because there are few works that address peacekeeping in the country. However, because of the similarities between the three countries regarding the size of their economies, and their similar contributions to peace operations, one could extrapolate that similar motivations and financial impacts that exist in Ghana and Nepal could be replicated in Burkina Faso.

Burkina Faso's Economy

Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in Western Africa. The lack of direct access to the sea, combined with limited natural resources and poor access to education, make it

one of the world's poorest countries. It ranked 131 out of 177 countries in 2014 according to the World Bank. Burkina Faso's economy relies mainly on three sectors: agriculture, mining, and the informal economy. Its main exports are cotton and gold. These two commodities, however, fluctuate according to world market prices, which makes Burkina Faso's economy vulnerable in the mid and long-term (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-West Africa 2016)

There is a more significant similarity between Burkina Faso's economy and that of Nepal than Ghana. Burkina Faso's GNI in 2014 was 700 USD, which makes it a low "income economy" in the same category with Nepal (The World Bank 2016a).

Despite Ghana's economy being larger than Burkina Faso's and Nepal's, mostly because of the impact of oil resources, all three are still developing countries and face the same challenges in the global economy. This study therefore provides reasonable grounds to analyze the economic impact of peacekeeping in the three countries from a comparative perspective.

Economic motivation to contribute

The rationales for contributing to UN peace operations in the case studies show that UN remittances represent a significant justification. The MOU between Burkina Faso and the UN provides interesting data on the reimbursements for equipment. The monthly reimbursement for the battalion in UNAMID (major equipment and self-sustainment) totals 645,000 USD starting on 4 August 2014 (Government of Burkina Faso and the United Nations 2015a). For the two battalions in MINUSMA, the reimbursement totals, 1,370,000 USD from 1 July 2014. From this data, it can be estimated that in 2015, Burkina Faso received a total reimbursement of 24 million USD (Government of Burkina

Faso and the United Nations 2015b). This amount does not take into account the Burkina Faso FPU in UNAMID. In the Ghana case study, the “profit” from peace operations in 2010 represented approximately 40 percent of the country’s total reimbursement (Aning and Aubyn 2013). Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that Burkina Faso receives a “profit” of 10 million USD for the three battalions deployed in UN peacekeeping.

Burkina Faso military expenditures in 2014 were 163.8 million USD (81.9 billion CFA) (SIPRI 2016). UN peacekeeping financial profit represents approximately 10 percent of the military expenditures and constitutes a significant input to the national economy.

The UN reimbursement for personnel also represents a significant motivation for Burkina Faso. It is a way to support troops’ morale. The quantitative study discusses the subject in detail.

In conclusion, the positive rating of the criterion “economic motivation to contribute” for Ghana and Nepal, is equally valid for Burkina Faso. Economic gain is a rationale for Burkina Faso’s contribution to UN peace operations.

Reinvestment in the Armed Forces

The case studies reveal that both Ghana and Nepal have a mechanism of reinvesting UN peacekeeping financial profits into their armed forces. In Ghana, the money serves in the acquisition of new equipment. In Nepal, it supports a welfare program for the nation’s military and veterans. There is no UN requirement for countries to reinvest the reimbursements in their armed forces. However, this option has proven useful in supporting national efforts to improve and sustain their armed forces.

By contrast, Burkina–Faso has no set policy for reinvestment of UN peacekeeping funds in the military but it could profit from policies similar to Ghana or Nepal. Similar

to Ghana, the UN reimbursement could support the peacekeeping effort in training and equipment as well as the nation's national security needs. The latter is even more important considering the recent developments in the security environment in West Africa and Burkina Faso, characterized by terrorist attacks in Mali on November 20, 2015, in Burkina Faso on January 15, 2016, and in Côte d'Ivoire on March 13, 2016. Particularly, the attacks in Burkina Faso have revealed that considerable efforts are necessary to improve intelligence gathering and response capacity of Burkina Faso security forces. The fact that no internal intelligence reports anticipated the attacks, combined with the difficulties in neutralizing the terrorists, has drawn many criticisms in the national opinion. As a result, peacekeeping remittances could be support efforts to train and equip the national intelligence community and/or quick response forces.

The researcher has not found clear evidence of a reinvestment mechanism in Burkina Faso. However, from the information available in the case studies, such investment could be profitable to the BFAF.

Table 6 synthesizes the scoring of the variables of the case study of Burkina Faso.

Table 6. Scoring of variables for the analysis of Burkina Faso

Serial	Variables	Burkina Faso
1	Size of economy	(+)
2	Economic motivation to contribute	(+)
3	Reinvestment in Armed Forces	(0)

Source: Created by author.

Table 7 compiles and synthesizes the scoring of variables for the two case studies and Burkina Faso.

Table 7. Scoring of variables for Ghana, Nepal, and Burkina Faso

Serial	Variables	Ghana	Nepal	Burkina Faso
1	Size of economy	(+)	(+)	(+)
2	Economic motivation to contribute	(+)	(+)	(+)
3	Reinvestment in Armed Forces	(+)	(+)	(0)

Source: Created by author.

Risk assessment

The case studies of Ghana and Nepal have unveiled risks related to the countries' large participation to peace operations, despite significant financial returns.

Internal security challenges are the main risk regarding the increased contribution of Ghana to UN peacekeeping. For Ghana, contributing a large part of GAF to UN peace operations creates a vacuum in the security structure at home. Twenty percent of GAF are utilized in UN peacekeeping (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016a). In case of internal trouble, the GAF will find it difficult to effectively face such challenges. To mitigate this risk, Ghana will reduce its contribution to UN peacekeeping during anticipated periods of risks such as elections (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016a).

Nepal faces two main risks in relation with its participation to UN peacekeeping. First, domestic instability remains a challenge for a sustainable peacekeeping policy. Due to several changes of governments in the last two decades, Nepal has not developed a

coherent and strong policy on peacekeeping (Providing for Peacekeeping 2016b). The lack of stability is a major concern for Nepal and could become a threat to its contribution to UN peace operations. Secondly, the cholera scandal in Haiti in 2010 and 2011 has tarnished the image of Nepal in general and Nepalese peacekeepers within the peacekeeping community (Sotomayor 2014, 307). This situation obviously creates a problem of trust between Nepalese peacekeepers and local populations wherever they are deployed. There is no evidence of specific measures, except the withdrawal of Nepalese peacekeepers from Haiti, in the aftermath of the scandal. However, this unfortunate experience requires Nepal to develop actions that will prevent similar events from happening in the future.

The risks that face Ghana and Nepal are applicable to Burkina Faso and it is important that it quickly analyzes and integrates them in its peacekeeping policies. In fact, the threats that regional extremist organizations pose and terrorist attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire in 2015 and 2016 constitute a clear challenge to Burkina Faso's ongoing contribution to peacekeeping. In order for the economic benefits to remain, authorities in Burkina Faso must develop initiatives to balance the massive export of military expertise in UN peace operations by establishing a strong domestic security structure.

The quantitative study

The researcher received 69 responses from 80 persons asked to take the survey. The questionnaire included the following questions:

1. You are:

An officer / An NCO / An Enlisted

2. What type of UN Mission did you participate? (circle one answer)
Contingent / MILOBS / UNPOL / UN Staff Officer
3. Which of the following categories does your monthly income (salary + allowances) in Burkina Faso fit in?
0 to 200000 FCFA (200-400 USD) / 200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (400-600 USD) / 300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (600-800 USD) / More than 400000 FCFA (800 USD)
4. What amount of money did you receive on a monthly basis during your UN mission? (circle one answer)
500000 FCFA (1000 USD) / 500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (1000-2000 USD) / 1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (2000-4000 USD) / More than 2 million FCFA (4000 USD)
5. Did the total amount received during the mission make a significant change to your financial status? (circle one answer)
YES/NO
6. Explain your answer.
7. If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? (circle one answer)
House or land/Car/Personal health/Family needs/Other:
8. Before your selection to participate in a peacekeeping mission, how did knowing you would get the UN remuneration affect your morale?

9. Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment? (With explanation)

YES/NO

10. Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?
(circle one answer)

YES/NO

11. What comment or suggestion would you make to military leadership concerning UN missions' remunerations procedures in Burkina Faso?

Yes/No questions

Table 8 shows the results of the Yes/No questions for all demographic variables:

Table 8. Analysis of Yes/No Questions

Question		Metric	Yes	No
Did the total amount received during the mission make a significant change to your financial status?		Count	54	15
		Percent	78	22
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money?	House or land	Count	56	13
		Percent	81	19
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money?	Car	Count	10	59
		Percent	14	86
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money?	Personal health	Count	5	64
		Percent	7	93
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money?	Family needs	Count	21	48
		Percent	30	70
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money?	Other	Count	4	65
		Percent	6	94
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?		Count	7	57
		Percent	11	89
Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?		Count	57	10
		Percent	85	15

Source: Created by author using output data from survey.

Summary of the data collected

The majority of participants to the survey (78 percent think that mission income has had a significant impact of their financial status. The primary investment for all participants is the acquisition of land or house, followed respectively by 30 percent citing “family needs,” fourteen percent citing “car”, 7 percent citing “personal health”, and 6 percent citing “other”.

The individual soldier’s gain in UN peacekeeping

Table 9 show results for questions 3 and 4.

Table 9. Demographic Data by Monthly Income in Burkina Faso

Which of the following categories does your monthly income (salary + allowances) in Burkina Faso fit in?		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 to 200000 FCFA (200 USD-400USD)	25	36.2	36.8	36.8
	200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (400 USD-600 USD)	22	31.9	32.4	69.1
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (600 USD-800 USD)	12	17.4	17.6	86.8
	More than 400000 FCFA (800 USD)	9	13.0	13.2	100.0
	Total	68	98.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.4		
Total		69	100.0		

Source: Created by author using output data from survey.

Table 10 shows the demographic data by monthly income in UN mission.

Table 10. Demographic Data by Monthly Income in UN Mission

What amount of money did you receive on a monthly basis during your UN mission?		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	500000 FCFA (1000 USD)	38	55.1	56.7	56.7
	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (1000 USD–2000 USD)	18	26.1	26.9	83.6
	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (2000 USD-4000 USD)	6	8.7	9.0	92.5
	More than 2 million FCFA (4000 USD)	5	7.2	7.5	100.0
	Total	67	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	2.9		
Total		69	100.0		

Source: Created by author using output data from survey.

Table 11 provides a comparison of the two incomes per grade and per types of mission by defining an income ratio (Inc Rat) which is the proportion of mission income by home income.

Table 11. Comparison of income ratio per grade

Category	N	Mean	Income Ratio (mission income/home income)
1 Ln(Income Ratio) Enlisted	15	1.2572	3.51556
2 Ln(Income Ratio) NCO	28	0.9306	2.53603
3 Ln(Income Ratio) Officer	23	1.1419	3.13271

Source: Created by author using output data from survey.

Table 11 shows that all soldiers, regardless of rank, gain significant amounts of money in UN mission compared to their home incomes. The ratio is larger for enlisted soldiers who earn an average of 3.51 times more in UN peacekeeping missions. NCOs follow and gain an average of 2.53 times more in UN peacekeeping missions.

In contrast to NCOs and enlisted who only participate as contingent members, officers can also participate as UN staff officers or MILOBs in peace operations. Therefore, this chart does not provide an accurate description of income ratios for officers.

Table 12 breaks down officers' participation per mission type.

Table 12. Comparison of income ratio for officers

Category	N (number of participants)	Mean	Income Ratio
1 Ln(Inc Rat)_Contingent	12	0.6478	1.91133
2 Ln(Inc Rat)_MILOBS	3	2.1064	8.21860
3 Ln(Inc Rat)_UN Staff Off	8	1.5215	4.57909

Source: Created by author using output data from survey.

The results show that officers gain less in contingents (1.91 times their home income) than all other types of missions (8.21 times as MILOB and 4.6 times as Staff). Consequently, the financial motivation will be lower for officers to participate in contingents.

Motivation to participate

Based on the responses received for question 9, the large majority of participants, 89 percent, think that the hardships of a one-year deployment are not worth the financial gain. Further, the survey participants indicated that, the risk of death or serious injury, and separation from their families are the main reasons why participants think the financial gain does not compensate the suffering during deployments.

However, despite their negative answers to question 9, a large majority of participants (85 percent) see financial gain as an incentive to deploy in future UN missions (Question 10).

In order to understand the contradictory responses to questions 9 and 10, the researcher analyzed comparisons of responses by various variables.

The Kruskal-Wallis comparison by the Rank/Grade demographic resulted in statistically significant differences for two of the Yes/No questions. Details are in table 13.

Table 13. Comparisons of Likert Scale Question Responses by Rank/Grade

Question	Rank/Grade	N	Mean Rank	Yes percent	No percent
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?	Officer	21	25.33	33	67
	NCO	26	36.00	0	100
	Enlisted	17	36.00	0	100
Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?	Enlisted	17	30.97	94	6
	NCO	27	31.48	93	7
	Officer	23	39.20	70	30

Source: Created by author using output data from survey.

This table shows that 33 percent of officers responded Yes to question 9 as opposed to the clear-cut 100 percent No response-rate from NCOs and enlisted.

The Kruskal-Wallis comparison by the Mission Type demographic resulted in statistically significant differences for one of the Yes/No questions. Details are in table 14.

Table 14. Comparisons of Likert Scale Question Responses by Mission Type

Question	Mission Type	N	Mean Rank	Yes percent	No percent
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?	MILOBS	3	14.67	67	33
	UN Staff Officer	8	20.00	50	50
	Contingent	53	35.40	2	98

Source: Created by author using output data from survey.

This table shows that MILOBs (67 percent) consider that the financial gain is worth the yearlong deployment while an overwhelming majority of contingent members (98 percent) thinks otherwise.

The Kruskal-Wallis comparison by the Burkina Faso Income demographic resulted in statistically significant differences for one of the Yes/No questions. Details are in table 15.

Table 15. Comparisons of Likert Scale Question Responses by Burkina Faso Income

Question	Burkina Faso monthly Income	N	Mean Rank	Yes percent	No percent
Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?	0 to 200000 FCFA (200 USD-400 USD)	24	29.88	96	4
	More than 400000 FCFA (800 USD)	8	32.63	88	13
	200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (400 USD - 600 USD)	22	33.00	86	14
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (600 USD-800 USD)	12	42.25	58	42

Source: Created by author using output data from survey.

This table shows that motivation decreases as home income increases. However, financial gain remains a motivation for the majority of participants.

Interpretation of the results

The results show that mission income has a significant impact on soldiers' financial status. Soldiers use the money they receive from UN mission to invest in basic needs such as land, houses, family needs, a car, or health issues.

Soldiers deployed in UN peacekeeping earn significant amounts of money from UN personnel reimbursement. All things being equal, the analysis of the ratio UN income/Home income shows that officers in contingents make less money (1.91 times their home income) than any other grade. As a comparison, the ratio is 8.21 for MILOBS officers, 3.51 for enlisted, and 2.53 for NCOs. Additionally, the results show that soldiers who make higher home incomes are less interested in UN peacekeeping.

Money represents an incentive for soldiers to deploy in future missions. However, there is a discrepancy between contingent members and other peacekeepers (UN Staff Officers, UN Military Observers). The higher the financial retribution, the more soldiers are motivated to participate. As an example, while 98 percent of contingent members think the financial gain does not compensate the yearlong deployment. Sixty seven (67) percent of MILOBS think otherwise. This makes sense as they earn up to 8.21 times their home income. Additionally, the results show that financial motivation to participate decreases as home income increases. Therefore, soldiers who have higher home income will only be financially motivated by higher paying missions such as UN staff or MILOBS. For such soldiers (officers in contingents for example), there is little to no financial motivation to participate in UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless, this does not neglect the importance of other types of motivations such as “sense of duty” or “commitment to defend the country’s interests.”

Open-ended questions

Questions 6, 8 and 11 provided an opportunity for participants to expand on their response and to provide personal suggestions or opinions.

Question 6

This question asked the participant to explain his answer to question 5 “did the total amount received during the mission make a significant change to your financial status?”

For the 74 percent of contingent members who responded “Yes,” peacekeeping money allowed them to have a temporary improved standard of living or to stabilize their finances. They were able to support their families,⁺⁺⁺⁺ buy land, or build houses. The financial profit is even more significant as these investments were possible without them having to take long-term loans from their banks. Additionally, for those who built their houses, peacekeeping significantly changed their financial status, freeing up a great amount of disposable income. In fact, these benefits are important in the long term as they remove key financial burdens from the peacekeeper such as rents for their houses and allow them to contract loans for other important needs.

For the 26 percent who responded “No,” the explanation indicated that soldiers did not receive the money on regular basis. In other words, after they return from their mission, they wait for months without receiving large amounts of their monthly allowances. This is caused by the delays in the payment procedures described by

⁺⁺⁺⁺ Family in Burkina Faso’s culture is not restricted to the nuclear family. It could include second, third, or fourth degree of relationship.

Coleman in the *The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping: Incentivizing Effective Participation*. In addition to the delays in the payment procedures, some participants did not profit from the mission subsidies simply because they had too many needs that did not allow for a large investment.

One hundred percent of Staff Officers and MILOBs responded “Yes.” For them, the UN money is clearly a game changer. They enjoy the same advantages as the contingent members but they can afford more significant investments (house, car, land). One of the participants pointed out that he saved the equivalent of 25 times the amount of money he used to save from his home salary from his MSA. For this category, the UN money allows them to make huge investments without having to borrow money with long-term individual financial benefits.

Question 8

Participants had to respond to the question: “Before your selection to participate in a peacekeeping mission, how did knowing you would get the UN remuneration affect your morale?” The results show that 44 participants (64 percent) responded that it positively affected their morale, 13 (19 percent) participants responded that it did not affect them and 12 (17 percent) did not provide an answer or provided an answer that could not be interpreted as positive or negative.

The answers to this question are closely related to those in question 6. Participants who were positively affected by participating in UN peacekeeping anticipated the financial benefits that they would get from the mission. However, some of them were disappointed, as the amount of money they received did not address all the problems and achieve the projects they had expected. The answers do not show any tangible

explanation to the fact that for 19 percent of participants, the future UN mission did not affect their morale.

Question 11

Participants responded to the question: “What comment or suggestion would you make to military leadership concerning UN missions’ remuneration procedures in Burkina Faso?”

This question was more relevant to contingent members, who receive the bulk of their incomes from their sponsoring nations. Participants made two main recommendations towards improving remuneration procedures. First, they suggested that a system is put in place that allows the payment of the total amount of money due to each soldier immediately upon return to their home country. This would allow soldiers to have a substantial amount of money for their personal and family projects. Delay in payment result in soldiers spending their money on everyday needs and not being able to make significant investments. Secondly, some participants suggested an increase of the amount of compensation. Interestingly, the participants who made this recommendation are all NCOs or Enlisted. Given that Burkina Faso gives the full amount paid by the UN to its soldiers, it is possible that there is a lack of understanding of the disbursement procedures. This recommendation will be addressed in chapter 5.

Summary

The economic impact of peace operations in Burkina Faso is twofold:

First, peacekeeping provides financial benefits to BFAF. The case studies of Ghana and Nepal demonstrate that UN compensation provides substantial input in the

TCCs economies. Benefits fall into two categories, direct and indirect financial gains. Direct gains are made of the monthly UN reimbursement for equipment and personnel that the UN gives each TCC. Indirect gains include other financial returns resulting from the TCC's contribution to peacekeeping.

Ghana and Nepal's economies have a relatively low ranking. This increases the financial effect of peacekeeping reimbursements, as this source of revenue constitute a motivation. Clearly, peacekeeping is as a way to support the country's small budget by maintaining a constant influx of money through troop contribution.

Ghana benefits from both direct and indirect gains. For example, its peacekeeping efforts have sent a positive image of the country and brought international investments in GAF. These indirect benefits contribute to alleviate Ghana's financial burdens. Ghana reinvests its peacekeeping money in the military by acquiring new equipment and improving its logistics capability.

In Nepal, peacekeeping represents a more important motivation for the institution. The Nepal Army is a source of revenue to counter the regression of tourism in the country and maintenance of a large standing army. Additionally, in addition to COE reimbursements, Nepal deducts money from their troops' pays to support its economy. The spans of Nepal's financial gains in peacekeeping therefore constitute a strong incentive to maintain its status as a top UN TCC. Nepal reinvests the financial benefits of peacekeeping in the Nepal Army Welfare Fund that supports veterans and their families.

The conclusions from the case studies of Ghana and Nepal are relevant to Burkina Faso because the need to obtain funds to support a weak economy is common to the three countries. In spite of the lack of peacekeeping experience in Burkina Faso compared to

the two case studies, the large number of troops and equipment that it currently has in several peacekeeping theaters is a source of revenue. On the other hand, there is no evidence that Burkina Faso reinvests the UN money in the military. Though the UN does not require TCCs to reinvest in their military, the positive examples of Ghana and Nepal show that it would be beneficial for Burkina Faso to invest some of the peacekeeping money to support welfare, maintain BFAF readiness and reinforce internal security. Such a reinvestment presents the advantage of addressing the risks created by the increasing troop contribution to peacekeeping.

Secondly, peacekeeping benefits the individual soldier. The Burkinabè peacekeeper gains from 1.91 to 8.21 times their home income for the same period. This money allows them to make investments within a short time (land, house, car, personal health, and family needs) that they could not have afforded otherwise. The positive impact of the UN money that can be a lasting and long-term benefit for the individual soldiers is a motivation for soldiers to participate in peacekeeping missions, despite the risks and the hardships of a long deployment.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Analyzing peacekeeping in Burkina Faso in general, and from an economic perspective in particular, is a difficult task because there is little academic work on the topic. Burkina Faso's recent large-scale contribution to UN peacekeeping is certainly one of the reasons for the lack of academic resources. Despite the dearth in available data, based on the research conducted in this study, we can make some conclusions and recommendations. First, in light of on the case studies of countries with a similar profile to Burkina Faso and a survey of the experience of the BFAF, we can draw some conclusions on the economic impact of peacekeeping on Burkina Faso. From the case studies, we can determine that the overall economic impact on the country is positive and will remain so in spite of risks related to terrorist threats in the country and in West Africa. With clearly defined policy development as indicated in the recommendations, Burkina Faso can leverage its peacekeeping experience to support its economy. Second, from the quantitative study, we can determine that the PK experience is also positive from the individual's perspective but financial and administrative processes need improvement in order to ensure maximum benefit for the individual.

At the country level, the qualitative study has shown that the economic impact of UN peacekeeping on Burkina Faso is significant. The Burkinabè units currently active on peacekeeping theaters provide enormous financial returns for the country. This study has shown that in 2015, Burkina Faso gained up to 24 million USD in UN reimbursements for the three infantry battalions deployed in MINUSMA and UNAMID, a strong financial motivation considering the size of its economy. Burkina Faso also benefits in the long-

term from investments made by soldiers through major acquisitions such as land, houses, and cars. Based on the case studies of Ghana and Nepal, we can conclude that Burkina Faso is motivated by the economic gain of its troop contribution to UN peacekeeping, mainly through COE reimbursement but also by the long-term effects of individual profits and investments in the country.

At the individual soldier's level, the study has shown that money is a motivation to participate in UN peace operations. Burkinabè soldiers gain 1.91 to 8.21 times their home income in UN peacekeeping missions. Annex A to "Amendment #4 to MOU between Burkina Faso and the United Nations for the deployment of an Infantry Battalion to UNAMID" determines the new rates of reimbursement for personnel to 1,332 USD per person per month from 1 July 2014 (Government of Burkina Faso and the United Nations 2015a). Despite the fact that financial gain is a strong motivation for soldiers of all categories, there are differences for officers. Officers are more motivated to participate as MILOBs or UN staff officers than contingent members because they gain less when they are members of a contingent with the lowest income ratio of all categories.

Many factors justify why UN money represents a motivation for soldiers. Burkinabè peacekeepers use the money to purchase land, houses, cars, pay for health issues, or invest in family needs. These investments would not be possible for most of them otherwise. Without the UN money, soldiers, like most government employees would have had to take loans over long periods. However, payment delays cause many Burkinabè peacekeepers to wait for months without receiving large portions of their UN salaries. As a result, some of them have already spent much of their money in minor

needs and can no longer afford to make significant investments by the time they receive their last payment.

Reinvestment policies of Ghana and Nepal show the importance of the UN money in sustaining TCCs' militaries and support troop contributions. Unlike Ghana and Nepal, there is no evidence that Burkina Faso reinvests the UN peacekeeping money in the BFAF. However, the establishment of such policies could contribute to support the BFAF by acquiring new equipment, maintaining a modern profile, and providing welfare to soldiers and their families.

Though UN peacekeeping provides financial benefits for Burkina Faso, the status of TCC has generated unintended consequences on the BFAF's ability to fulfill its other duties at the domestic level. The current developments in the regional security environment, characterized by the growth of terrorism and religious extremism, have shown that Burkina Faso faces new threats. In order to maintain a sufficient state of readiness and response capability, it is important to balance the contribution to peacekeeping with a strong domestic security posture.

This research proved that money is a motivation for the country and for the individual soldier. In fact, peacekeeping remittances are a way, in addition to other factors that this study does not address, to support troops' morale. In Burkina Faso in particular, troops' morale is a key parameter that all commanders regularly check and monitor. Thus, having soldiers participate in UN peace operations helps maintain soldiers' morale.

Based on the conclusions, we can make five key recommendations to improve the existing peacekeeping management and mitigate risk in Burkina Faso.

Recommendations in relation with UN peacekeeping in Burkina Faso

Analyze peacekeeping benefits from an economic perspective and adjust contribution accordingly

For Burkina Faso to optimize the economic benefit of its participation in UN peacekeeping, it is crucial to conduct a thorough analysis of the current state of contribution and adjust it to maximize profit. The deployment of large contingents such as infantry battalions represents significant logistic challenges for the sustainment of so many soldiers. For countries like Burkina Faso, which contributes three infantry battalions in two different theaters, the individual soldier's benefits are clearly significant. However, because COE reimbursements are those that directly benefit TCCs, Burkina Faso should adjust its contribution to maintain the level of individual benefits while increasing the country's gain. To achieve this objective, Burkina Faso should start contributing specialized units that have key organic equipment in sufficient numbers to generate reimbursements that are more significant. Aviation, signal, transportation, and engineer units for instance have a large number of organic equipment that would provide larger financial returns. It would then be profitable for Burkina Faso to reduce the contribution of infantry battalions and emphasize on the deployment of specialized units, smaller, but with more equipment. This would even be more beneficial, as it would help mitigate the risk of unbalance in the domestic security structure stated in the risk analysis. Additionally, deploying more specialized units would not reduce individual benefits as the larger contribution of company size specialized units would compensate the reduction of infantry battalions' personnel. Burkina Faso would therefore deploy approximately the same number of troops but a larger number of specialized units that provide better financial returns for the country.

Assess the impact of peacekeeping on the national security structure

Burkina Faso's contribution to peacekeeping has generated a significant stress on the BFAF. Because the BFAF is a relatively small force, it finds itself with a large portion of its troops continuously deployed on various peacekeeping theaters. Meanwhile, the terrorist threat has increased over the last years, culminating with the terrorist attacks in Ouagadougou on January 15, 2016, and claiming the lives of twenty-nine innocent people (Ouedraogo and Ahmed 2016). Considering the case studies and the related risk assessment, Burkina Faso should review the current size of its contribution in order to improve its ability to respond effectively to threats of terrorism. A drawdown of Burkina Faso's participation to UN peacekeeping is a conceivable solution that could help maintain an acceptable level of contribution while strengthening the national security structure to face current threats.

Improve payment procedures for personnel

The survey has shown the importance of peacekeeping money for individual soldiers who use it to improve their financial status, acquire essential goods, and invest in long-term projects. However, many participants find it hard to use the UN money efficiently, because of the delays in the payments. Simply put, many soldiers are not able to make significant investments and acquisitions because they do not receive the total amount of the money immediately upon return to their country. It sometimes takes up to six months before former peacekeepers receive the full amount of their UN salaries. The issue of payment procedures has always been a concern for BFAF leadership who has implemented a systematic monthly prepayment of 400 USD to peacekeepers in their

home bank account and 50 USD on their mission site, which represents less than half of the UN salary, to help soldiers take care of their families' needs. Receiving the remainder of the money immediately upon return would allow them to make better and more significant investments. Burkina Faso could solve this problem by pre-financing the total amount of the money right after soldiers' return from their mission by calculating the amount due to each soldier, based on the exchange rate between USD and CFA Franc at the time of the end of the mission. The country would then improve its peacekeepers ability to make a better use of their UN money.

The fact that Burkina Faso gives the full personnel reimbursement it receives from the UN to its contingents' peacekeepers is a positive initiative. However, some participants have pointed out the fact that officers, NCOs and enlisted receive the same salary, as the UN reimburses the same amount for each peacekeeper, regardless of rank. This could explain why officers in contingents are less motivated than any other category. It is also inherent to the military, arguably the most hierarchical and organized institution in the world, that salaries are indexed to rank to reflect authority and responsibility. It is certainly not suitable to adjust payment procedure by decreasing lower categories' salaries and increasing higher categories. However, Burkina Faso should provide distinct substantial allowances, in addition to the existing payment procedures, to reflect rank structure, or category at a minimum. This would improve morale and boost discipline in the ranks.

Inform soldiers on UN peacekeeping payment procedures and best ways to manage their gains

In the survey, many soldiers have suggested that national authorities increase the amount of personnel reimbursements. This obviously shows a lack of understanding of the payment procedures and the financial limitations of Burkina Faso. Some of the participants seem to misunderstand how the system works and where the money comes from. This is not to say that an increase of UN salaries is impossible. Nevertheless, Burkina Faso is only “transferring” the full personnel reimbursement to its contingents’ peacekeepers and changes in the reimbursements are decided above national level. BFAF leadership should therefore anticipate by communicating regularly with soldiers on the payment procedures.

Additionally, many participants have described their frustrations of not being able to make significant investments upon return from the mission because they had many needs for limited financial resources. This outlines a certain lack of financial management from their part. It would be beneficial for Burkina Faso to include a financial awareness module in the pre-deployment training to cover aspects related to payment procedures and provide soldiers with basic financial management tools. This would help them make the best profit out of the money they receive from UN peacekeeping. In general, BFAF should improve communication on peacekeeping matters, including financial aspects within the Armed Forces. This would send a message of transparency to all soldiers and prevent misunderstandings or false expectations from peacekeepers.

Reinvestment of peacekeeping benefits in Burkina Faso Armed Forces

The case studies have showed examples of successful reinvestments of peacekeeping money. In Burkina Faso, the researcher suggests that four axes get the most attention from decision makers. First, the financial returns of peacekeeping could support the acquisition of equipment in support of BFAF peacekeeping operations as well as internal units. This equipment would sustain the peacekeeping effort and improve units' readiness. Second, the peacekeeping financial benefits could support the building and maintenance of a modern peacekeeping training center with all relevant facilities to support pre-deployment training of peacekeepers as well as serve as the intellectual center of peacekeeping in Burkina Faso. Third, decision-makers could use the financial returns of peacekeeping to build a modern military hospital for active and former military members. Finally, peacekeeping money could support the creation of morale and welfare facilities on military installation such as gymnasiums, swimming pools and recreational facilities.

Recommendations for further studies

This study purposefully focused on the financial aspect of peacekeeping in Burkina Faso. However, the researcher acknowledges the larger spectrum of peacekeeping for any given TCCs. As a result, the researcher suggests that further research focus on the professional impact of peacekeeping for BFAF. This could help determine whether there is a professional improvement of BFAF through participation in UN peacekeeping with the experience soldiers acquire in peacekeeping theaters.

Terrorism and various types of extremisms are important world issues in the global security environment. For a “young” TCC such as Burkina Faso, this challenge is even more important considering the size of the military and the contribution to UN peacekeeping. Therefore, further studies could analyze the impact of large troop contributions to peacekeeping on the national security structure.

APPENDIX A

SURVEY (Protocol Approval Number 15-12-005)

1. You are:

An officer / An NCO / An Enlisted

2. What type of UN Mission did you participate? (circle one answer)

Contingent / MILOBS / UNPOL / UN Staff Officer

3. Which of the following categories does your monthly income (salary + allowances) in Burkina Faso fit in?

0 to 200000 FCFA (200-400 USD) / 200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (400-600 USD) / 300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (600-800 USD) / More than 400000 FCFA (800 USD)

4. What amount of money did you receive on a monthly basis during your UN mission? (circle one answer)

500000 FCFA (1000 USD) / 500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (1000-2000 USD) / 1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (2000-4000 USD) / More than 2 million FCFA (4000 USD)

5. Did the total amount received during the mission make a significant change to your financial status? (circle one answer)

YES/NO

6. Explain your answer.

7. If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? (circle one answer)

House or land/Car/Personal health/Family needs/Other:

8. Before your selection to participate in a peacekeeping mission, how did knowing you would get the UN remuneration affect your morale?
9. Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment? (With explanation)
- YES/NO
10. Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?
- (circle one answer)
- YES/NO
11. What comment or suggestion would you make to military leadership concerning UN missions' remunerations procedures in Burkina Faso?

APPENDIX B

OUTPUT DATA

I. Demographics

In this section we tabulate the demographic data used in the analysis and comparison sections of this report. We provide count data on the number of individuals surveyed and the number of respondents. We indicate the aggregate confidence interval ($\alpha = 0.05$). Based on 69 respondents from a population of 80 individuals invited to complete the survey, the margin of error in the point estimates is $\pm 4\%$ ($\alpha = 0.05$).

Demographic Data by Rank/Grade

You are?		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Officer	24	34.8	34.8	34.8
	NCO	28	40.6	40.6	75.4
	Enlisted	17	24.6	24.6	100.0
	Total	69	100.0	100.0	

Demographic Data by Mission Type

What type of UN Mission did you participate in?		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Contingent	57	82.6	82.6	82.6
	MILOBS	3	4.3	4.3	87.0
	UN Staff Officer	9	13.0	13.0	100.0
	Total	69	100.0	100.0	

Demographic Data by Monthly Income in Burkina Faso

Which of the following categories does your monthly income (salary + allowances) in Burkina Faso fit in?		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 to 200000 FCFA (\$200-\$400)	25	36.2	36.8	36.8
	200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (\$400 - \$600)	22	31.9	32.4	69.1
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (\$600 - \$800)	12	17.4	17.6	86.8
	More than 400000 FCFA (\$800)	9	13.0	13.2	100.0
	Total	68	98.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.4		
Total		69	100.0		

Demographic Data by Monthly Income in UN Mission

What amount of money did you receive on a monthly basis during your UN mission?		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	500000 FCFA (\$1000)	38	55.1	56.7	56.7
	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (\$1000 - \$2000)	18	26.1	26.9	83.6
	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (\$2000 - \$4000)	6	8.7	9.0	92.5
	More than 2 million FCFA (\$4000)	5	7.2	7.5	100.0
	Total	67	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	2.9		
Total		69	100.0		

II. Analysis

In this section we report the findings (count and percent data) for the questions on the Survey. Results for each question are grouped by each of the demographic variables in section 1 and in aggregate. The groupings in this section aren't necessarily intended for comparison purposes, but simply for compactness of tabulation/data presentation. Comparisons for the questions involving Yes/No responses are provided in section 3, below.

In this paragraph we present the results of the Yes/No question responses.

Analysis of Yes/No Questions

Question		Metric	Yes	No
Did the total amount received during the mission make a significant change to your financial status?		Count	54	15
		Percent	78	22
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money?	House or land	Count	56	13
		Percent	81	19
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money?	Car	Count	10	59
		Percent	14	86
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money?	Personal health	Count	5	64
		Percent	7	93
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money?	Family needs	Count	21	48
		Percent	30	70
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money?	Other	Count	4	65
		Percent	6	94
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?		Count	7	57
		Percent	11	89
Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?		Count	57	10
		Percent	85	15

Source: Created by author.

In this paragraph we present the results of the Yes/No question responses grouped by the Rank/Grade demographic.

Analysis of Yes/No Questions by Rank/Grade

Question	Rank/Grade	Metric	Yes	No
Did the total amount received during the mission make a significant change to your financial status?	Officer	Count	20	4
		Percent	83	17
	NCO	Count	22	6
		Percent	79	21
	Enlisted	Count	12	5
		Percent	71	29

If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? House or land	Officer	Count	17	7
		Percent	71	29
	NCO	Count	24	4
		Percent	86	14
	Enlisted	Count	15	2
		Percent	88	12
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Car	Officer	Count	6	18
		Percent	25	75
	NCO	Count	3	25
		Percent	11	89
	Enlisted	Count	1	16
		Percent	6	94
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Personal health	Officer	Count	0	24
		Percent	0	100
	NCO	Count	2	26
		Percent	7	93
	Enlisted	Count	3	14
		Percent	18	82
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Family needs	Officer	Count	11	13
		Percent	46	54
	NCO	Count	5	23
		Percent	18	82
	Enlisted	Count	5	12
		Percent	29	71
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Other	Officer	Count	1	23
		Percent	4	96
	NCO	Count	2	26
		Percent	7	93
	Enlisted	Count	1	16
		Percent	6	94
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?	Officer	Count	7	14
		Percent	33	67
	NCO	Count	0	26
		Percent	0	100
	Enlisted	Count	0	17
		Percent	0	100
Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?	Officer	Count	16	7
		Percent	70	30
	NCO	Count	25	2
		Percent	93	7
	Enlisted	Count	16	1
		Percent	94	6

In this paragraph we present the results of the Yes/No question responses grouped by the Mission Type demographic.

Analysis of Yes/No Questions by Mission Type

Question	Mission Type	Metric	Yes	No
Did the total amount received during the mission make a significant change to your financial status?	Contingent	Count	42	15
		Percent	74	26
	MILOBS	Count	3	0
		Percent	100	0
	UNPOL	Count	0	0
		Percent	0	0
	UN Staff Officer	Count	9	0
		Percent	100	0
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? House or land	Contingent	Count	44	13
		Percent	77	23
	MILOBS	Count	3	0
		Percent	100	0
	UNPOL	Count	0	0
		Percent	0	0
	UN Staff Officer	Count	9	0
		Percent	100	0
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Car	Contingent	Count	8	49
		Percent	14	86
	MILOBS	Count	0	3
		Percent	0	100
	UNPOL	Count	0	0
		Percent	0	0
	UN Staff Officer	Count	2	7
		Percent	22	78
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Personal health	Contingent	Count	5	52
		Percent	9	91
	MILOBS	Count	0	3
		Percent	0	100
	UNPOL	Count	0	0
		Percent	0	0
	UN Staff Officer	Count	0	9
		Percent	0	100

If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Family needs	Contingent	Count	17	40
		Percent	30	70
	MILOBS	Count	0	3
		Percent	0	100
	UNPOL	Count	0	0
		Percent	0	0
	UN Staff Officer	Count	4	5
		Percent	44	56
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Other	Contingent	Count	4	53
		Percent	7	93
	MILOBS	Count	0	3
		Percent	0	100
	UNPOL	Count	0	0
		Percent	0	0
	UN Staff Officer	Count	0	9
		Percent	0	100
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?	Contingent	Count	1	52
		Percent	2	98
	MILOBS	Count	2	1
		Percent	67	33
	UNPOL	Count	0	0
		Percent	0	0
	UN Staff Officer	Count	4	4
		Percent	50	50
Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?	Contingent	Count	49	6
		Percent	89	11
	MILOBS	Count	2	1
		Percent	67	33
	UNPOL	Count	0	0
		Percent	0	0
	UN Staff Officer	Count	6	3
		Percent	67	33

In this paragraph we present the results of the Yes/No question responses grouped by the Monthly Income in Burkina Faso demographic.

Analysis of Yes/No Questions by Monthly Income in Burkina Faso

Question	Burkina Faso Income	Metric	Yes	No
Did the total amount received during the mission make a significant change to your financial status?	0 to 200000 FCFA (\$200-\$400)	Count	17	8
		Percent	68	32
	200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (\$400 - \$600)	Count	18	4
		Percent	82	18
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (\$600 - \$800)	Count	10	2
		Percent	83	17
	More than 400000 FCFA (\$800)	Count	8	1
		Percent	89	11
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? House or land	0 to 200000 FCFA (\$200-\$400)	Count	22	3
		Percent	88	12
	200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (\$400 - \$600)	Count	18	4
		Percent	82	18
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (\$600 - \$800)	Count	8	4
		Percent	67	33
	More than 400000 FCFA (\$800)	Count	7	2
		Percent	78	22
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Car	0 to 200000 FCFA (\$200-\$400)	Count	1	24
		Percent	4	96
	200000 FCFA to 300000	Count	3	19

	FCFA (\$400 - \$600)			
		Percent	14	86
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (\$600 - \$800)	Count	4	8
		Percent	33	67
	More than 400000 FCFA (\$800)	Count	2	7
		Percent	22	78
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Personal health	0 to 200000 FCFA (\$200-\$400)	Count	3	22
		Percent	12	88
	200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (\$400 - \$600)	Count	2	20
		Percent	9	91
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (\$600 - \$800)	Count	0	12
		Percent	0	100
	More than 400000 FCFA (\$800)	Count	0	9
		Percent	0	100
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Family needs	0 to 200000 FCFA (\$200-\$400)	Count	6	19
		Percent	24	76
	200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (\$400 - \$600)	Count	4	18
		Percent	18	82
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (\$600 - \$800)	Count	7	5
		Percent	58	42
	More than	Count	4	5

	400000 FCFA (\$800)			
		Percent	44	56
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Other	0 to 200000 FCFA (\$200-\$400)	Count	1	24
		Percent	4	96
	200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (\$400 - \$600)	Count	2	20
		Percent	9	91
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (\$600 - \$800)	Count	1	11
		Percent	8	92
	More than 400000 FCFA (\$800)	Count	0	9
		Percent	0	100
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?	0 to 200000 FCFA (\$200-\$400)	Count	1	22
		Percent	4	96
	200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (\$400 - \$600)	Count	1	21
		Percent	5	95
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (\$600 - \$800)	Count	3	8
		Percent	27	73
	More than 400000 FCFA (\$800)	Count	2	5
		Percent	29	71
Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?	0 to 200000 FCFA (\$200-\$400)	Count	23	1
		Percent	96	4
	200000 FCFA to 300000	Count	19	3

	FCFA (\$400 - \$600)			
		Percent	86	14
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (\$600 - \$800)	Count	7	5
		Percent	58	42
	More than 400000 FCFA (\$800)	Count	7	1
		Percent	88	13

In this paragraph we present the results of the Yes/No question responses grouped by the Monthly Income in UN Mission demographic.

Analysis of Yes/No Questions by Monthly Income in UN Mission

Question	UN Mission Income	Metric	Yes	No
Did the total amount received during the mission make a significant change to your financial status?	500000 FCFA (\$1000)	Count	27	11
		Percent	71	29
	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (\$1000 - \$2000)	Count	14	4
		Percent	78	22
	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (\$2000 - \$4000)	Count	6	0
		Percent	100	0
	More than 2 million FCFA (\$4000)	Count	5	0
		Percent	100	0
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? House or land	500000 FCFA (\$1000)	Count	29	9
		Percent	76	24

	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (\$1000 - \$2000)	Count	14	4
		Percent	78	22
	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (\$2000 - \$4000)	Count	6	0
		Percent	100	0
	More than 2 million FCFA (\$4000)	Count	5	0
		Percent	100	0
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Car	500000 FCFA (\$1000)	Count	3	35
		Percent	8	92
	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (\$1000 - \$2000)	Count	5	13
		Percent	28	72
	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (\$2000 - \$4000)	Count	1	5
		Percent	17	83
	More than 2 million FCFA (\$4000)	Count	1	4
		Percent	20	80
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Personal health	500000 FCFA (\$1000)	Count	4	34
		Percent	11	89
	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (\$1000 - \$2000)	Count	1	17
		Percent	6	94
	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (\$2000 - \$4000)	Count	0	6
		Percent	0	100
	More than 2 million FCFA (\$4000)	Count	0	5
		Percent	0	100

If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Family needs	500000 FCFA (\$1000)	Count	9	29
		Percent	24	76
	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (\$1000 - \$2000)	Count	8	10
		Percent	44	56
	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (\$2000 - \$4000)	Count	2	4
		Percent	33	67
	More than 2 million FCFA (\$4000)	Count	2	3
		Percent	40	60
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Other	500000 FCFA (\$1000)	Count	2	36
		Percent	5	95
	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (\$1000 - \$2000)	Count	2	16
		Percent	11	89
	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (\$2000 - \$4000)	Count	0	6
		Percent	0	100
	More than 2 million FCFA (\$4000)	Count	0	5
		Percent	0	100
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?	500000 FCFA (\$1000)	Count	1	34
		Percent	3	97
	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (\$1000 - \$2000)	Count	0	17
		Percent	0	100
	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (\$2000 - \$4000)	Count	3	3
		Percent	50	50
	More than 2	Count	2	2

Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?	million FCFA (\$4000)			
		Percent	50	50
	500000 FCFA (\$1000)	Count	35	1
		Percent	97	3
	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (\$1000 - \$2000)	Count	13	5
		Percent	72	28
	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (\$2000 - \$4000)	Count	3	3
		Percent	50	50
	More than 2 million FCFA (\$4000)	Count	4	1
		Percent	80	20

III. Comparisons

We compared the responses to the Yes/No scale survey questions by the demographics in section 1.

For these comparisons we used the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric mean rank test to see if statistically significant differences existed in the responses. Statistically significant differences are those that would be difficult to explain by chance alone. In each case we used $\alpha=.05$ as the significance level to determine if such differences existed.

We discuss only the cases in which we detected statistically significant differences. In the tables presented below a lower mean rank suggests that the result tends to be skewed more toward the Yes response. The lowest mean rank response is statistically significantly lower than the highest mean rank response. But we cannot

necessarily make this claim for other pairs of values between these two numbers.

Therefore, we focus attention primarily on the lowest and highest mean ranks. The results are sorted by Mean Rank (lowest to highest).

The Kruskal-Wallis comparison by the Rank/Grade demographic resulted in statistically significant differences for two of the Yes/No questions.

Comparisons of Likert Scale Question Responses by Rank/Grade

Question	Rank/Grade	N	Mean Rank	Yes %	No %
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?	Officer	21	25.33	33	67
	NCO	26	36.00	0	100
	Enlisted	17	36.00	0	100
Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?	Enlisted	17	30.97	94	6
	NCO	27	31.48	93	7
	Officer	23	39.20	70	30

Source: Created by author.

The Kruskal-Wallis comparison by the Mission Type demographic resulted in statistically significant differences for one of the Yes/No questions.

Comparisons of Likert Scale Question Responses by Mission Type

Question	Mission Type	N	Mean Rank	Yes %	No %
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?	MILOBS	3	14.67	67	33
	UN Staff Officer	8	20.00	50	50
	Contingent	53	35.40	2	98

Comparisons of Likert Scale Question Responses by Mission Type (Officers Only)

Question	Mission Type	N	Mean Rank	Yes %	No %
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? House or land	MILOBS	3	9.00	100	0
	UN Staff Officer	9	9.00	100	0
	Contingent	12	16.00	42	58
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?*	MILOBS	3	7.50	67	33
	UN Staff Officer	8	9.25	50	50
	Contingent	10	13.45	10	90

*Statistically significant at 10% level ($\alpha = 0.10$)

Analysis of eight questions by Mission Type, responses for officers only.

Question	Mission Type	Metric	Yes	No
Did the total amount received during the mission make a significant change to your financial status?	Contingent	Count	8	4
		Percent	67	33
	MILOBS	Count	3	0
		Percent	100	0
	UN Staff Officer	Count	9	0
		Percent	100	0
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? House or land*	Contingent	Count	5	7
		Percent	42	58
	MILOBS	Count	3	0
		Percent	100	0
	UN Staff Officer	Count	9	0
		Percent	100	0
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Car	Contingent	Count	4	8
		Percent	33	67
	MILOBS	Count	0	3
		Percent	0	100
	UN Staff Officer	Count	2	7
		Percent	22	78
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Personal health	Contingent	Count	0	12
		Percent	0	100
	MILOBS	Count	0	3
		Percent	0	100

	UN Staff Officer	Count	0	9
		Percent	0	100
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Family needs	Contingent	Count	7	5
		Percent	58	42
	MILOBS	Count	0	3
		Percent	0	100
	UN Staff Officer	Count	4	5
		Percent	44	56
If you responded YES to question 5, how did you invest the money? Other	Contingent	Count	1	11
		Percent	8	92
	MILOBS	Count	0	3
		Percent	0	100
	UN Staff Officer	Count	0	9
		Percent	0	100
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?*	Contingent	Count	1	9
		Percent	10	90
	MILOBS	Count	2	1
		Percent	67	33
	UN Staff Officer	Count	4	4
		Percent	50	50
Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?	Contingent	Count	8	3
		Percent	73	27
	MILOBS	Count	2	1
		Percent	67	33
	UN Staff Officer	Count	6	3
		Percent	67	33

*Statistically significant differences at 5% level ($\alpha = 0.05$)

**Statistically significant at 10% level ($\alpha = 0.10$)

The Kruskal-Wallis comparison by the Burkina Faso Income demographic resulted in statistically significant differences for one of the Yes/No questions.

Comparisons of Likert Scale Question Responses by Burkina Faso Income

Question	Burkina Faso Income	N	Mean Rank	Yes %	No %
Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?	0 to 200000 FCFA (\$200-\$400)	24	29.88	96	4
	More than 400000 FCFA (\$800)	8	32.63	88	13
	200000 FCFA to 300000 FCFA (\$400 - \$600)	22	33.00	86	14
	300000 FCFA to 400000 FCFA (\$600 - \$800)	12	42.25	58	42

The Kruskal-Wallis comparison by Income in UN Mission demographic resulted in statistically significant differences for one of the Yes/No questions.

Comparisons of Likert Scale Question Responses by Income in UN Mission

Question	Income in UN Mission	N	Mean Rank	Yes %	No %
Now that you have been to such missions, do you think the financial gain is worth the hardships of a one-year deployment?	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (\$2000 - \$4000)	6	19.00	50	50
	More than 2 million FCFA (\$4000)	4	19.00	50	50
	500000 FCFA (\$1000)	35	33.61	3	97
	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (\$1000 - \$2000)	17	34.50	0	100
Is financial gain an incentive for you to deploy in future UN Peacekeeping?	500000 FCFA (\$1000)	36	28.90	97	3
	More than 2 million FCFA (\$4000)	5	34.50	80	20

	500000 FCFA to 1 million FCFA (\$1000 - \$2000)	18	37.03	72	28
	1 million FCFA to 2 million FCFA (\$2000 - \$4000)	6	44.25	50	50

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